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Abstract 
Performance appraisals have come under fire recently in the field of Industrial-
Organizational Psychology, sparking some debate as to whether the field should continue 
the practice. The primary goal of this dissertation is to suggest that performance 
appraisals, within the lens of feedback, are a valuable tool and have some meaningful 
implications for individuals within organizations. The results from a 5-year archival 
longitudinal study suggest that (1) individuals tend to disagree initially from their 
manager’s rating of their performance, but converge with time; (2) the initial and 
longitudinal agreement in these ratings predicts individual outcomes (e.g. salary, 
organizational level, promotions) in predictable ways; and (3) that participation in 
another form of feedback procedure (i.e. a 360º feedback program) does not impact 
individual performance rating trajectories, but does influence the manager’s ratings of 
that performance in negative ways. 
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Feedback as an Organizational Intervention 
Employee performance evaluations are a ubiquitous and recurring management 
practice. They can serve many purposes: they are used strategically to link employee 
behavior and organizational goals; they also communicate important job-relevant 
information to employees; they often serve as the basis for employment decisions (e.g., 
promotion, training, or discipline); they are used as criteria in research; they can also 
influence employee’s personal and professional development; they can also be used to 
evaluate the organization’s effectiveness (Casio & Aguinis, 2005). It seems logical, then, 
that much research and theoretical attention has been paid to the performance appraisal 
process in both its quality of measurement and effectiveness in changing behavior.   
However, some debate has recently arisen in the Industrial-Organizational (I-O) 
Psychology field over whether performance ratings should be abandoned altogether (see 
Adler, et al., 2016 for an overview). Researchers in favor of discarding performance 
ratings suggest that they are “a failed experiment”, citing its inability to improve accuracy 
with different rating scales (Landy & Farr, 1980) or rater training (Murphy & Cleveland, 
1995), that irrelevant contextual effects play too large a role (e.g., political aspects), or 
that they often suffer from adverse impact amongst racial minorities (McKay & 
McDaniel, 2006). Others (e.g., Woehr & Roch, 2016) suggest that performance ratings do 
have value within the performance management process—“so while performance 
management in organizations may be a messy, poorly managed, and poorly implemented 
process, we should be cautious not to lay the blame on the quality of performance 
ratings” (Woehr & Roch, 2016, p. 360). Indeed, as Adler et al. (2016) put it: “the science 
of behavioral change… tells us that some discomfort, some feedback on the gap between 
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the ‘now’ state and the desired future is required to stimulate behavior change and 
development” (p. 235). 
Murphy and Cleveland (1995) discussed the role of performance appraisal as a 
form of feedback in-depth—they suggested that it may be a good idea for organizations 
to implement two separate systems to fulfill the multiple goals of performance reviews: 
“it may be a grave mistake to let the administrative side of appraisal interfere with the use 
of appraisal as a feedback tool” (p. 91). However, whether or not the performance 
appraisal is specified or designed to provide feedback to the employee does not impact its 
function as a feedback mechanism—it intrinsically provides some cues to the employee 
about their relative standing in the organization and their level performance as perceived 
by some other individual (typically the supervisor). 
The goals of this dissertation were: (1) to provide a background on and history of 
the theories of feedback, (2) to cite evidence for feedback’s effectiveness at changing 
behavior in organizational settings, (3) to discuss the relevant measurement 
considerations in the evaluation of job performance, and (4) to assess how self-other 
agreement plays a role in the appraisal process—complete with a discussion of its own 
models and findings within that niche of the performance appraisal literature. To clarify, 
the introduction focuses on the feedback function of ratings: particularly those made in 
the multisource feedback and performance appraisal literatures. Studies of ratings made 
in other domains (e.g., interviews, job applications, assessment centers) were avoided 
unless research in performance appraisal was sparse. This review will not touch on 
feedback-seeking behavior (see Anseel, Beatty, Shen, Lievens, & Sackett, 2015 for a 
3 
review), or on impression management tactics in performance appraisal
1
 (see Villanova 
& Bernardin, 1989 for a review) due to the expansive nature of both sets of literature and 
their tangential relevance to the goals outlined above. Following the literature review is a 
discussion of the present study and its contributions to the literature.  
Theories of Feedback 
The theoretical history of feedback in organizational settings has its bases in early 
experimental psychology and is particularly steeped in the behaviorist tradition—
researchers interested in how feedback could influence future behavior and learning 
developed theories of human behavior on the basis of animals’ abilities to learn how to 
complete experimental tasks in the laboratory. Later, theorizers applied these 
experimental findings to organizational settings—particularly to understand feedback’s 
effect on job performance—and adjusted their frameworks to suit their empirical findings 
and to direct future research. A history of these theories is outlined below. 
The Law of Effect.  Thorndike’s (1913) law of effect is arguably the most 
fundamental theory in understanding feedback. This law asserts that behaviors that 
produce a “satisfying effect” (i.e., reinforcement) in a certain situation are more likely to 
reoccur in that situation, while the reverse is true of behaviors that produce a 
“discomforting” effect. (i.e., punishment). Thus, performance should be improved 
regardless of the sign of feedback because positive feedback should increase correct 
behaviors and negative feedback should decrease incorrect ones. The law tended to hold 
very well in behaviorists’ experiments with animals. However, the principle did not 
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 However, the role of organizational politics will be discussed; these research areas have a large 
amount of overlap and therefore there may be expectations to discuss both. 
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always hold in human learning environments. Annett (1969) outlined several empirical 
findings which subverted this rule, and declared that the law of effect “has been rejected 
on both empirical and logical grounds” (p.169). Kluger and DeNisi (1996) similarly 
noted that the law of effect “has the advantage of parsimony, but it is too broad to explain 
the empirical complexities associated with FI [Feedback Interventions]” (p. 259). 
Knowledge of Results.  Harry Kay, in his foreword to Annett’s (1969) book on 
feedback, noted the effect of technology on our understanding of behavior: “The 
computer age is underway. This orientation which has been so much influenced by 
cybernetics and information theory has permeated our whole approach to human 
learning.” Indeed, early understanding of the influence of feedback on human behavior 
was very reminiscent of machine and computerized learning. Annett (1969) outlined the 
progression of thought in this area: from simple concepts like “stimulus leads to a 
response” (i.e., S → R), to servo-mechanisms and reinforcement theory.  The focus of his 
book, and what later became one of the bases of the feedback literature, was on 
Knowledge of Results (KR). He noted the difference between intrinsic KR—“that which 
is normally present and is not often subject to experimenter manipulation”—and extrinsic 
KR—“feedback being supplied by the experimenter or specially adapted by him” 
(Annett, 1969 p.26). As such, feedback was believed to have served three functions: an 
informative function, a reinforcing function, and an incentive function.  
However, Annett (1969) notes that KR researchers tended to “assert that KR has 
all three properties but decline to say how they are mixed or how they can be 
disentangled” (p. 37). He later concluded that the effects of each function could not, and 
should not, be isolated—“our main task has been to show that all the supposedly different 
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functions of KR can be derived from the properties of feedback systems without recourse 
to a ‘mixed’ theory” (p.160). Annett (1969) further reduced the issue: “The informative 
value of KR is seen in terms not only of the information content of the ‘results’ but also 
in relation to the kind of transformation rule the learner is using” (p. 169). Thus, the focus 
of KR researchers moved away from delineating the relative effectiveness of feedback 
along these three variables, but still lacked an organizing framework. 
Feedback in Organizations.  Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) took note of this 
issue, particularly within the organizational feedback literature. At the time, the literature 
on feedback in organizational settings was somewhat disjointed—generalizations about 
the effects of feedback were difficult to make. They suggested that this was due mostly to 
two factors: (1) that feedback is multifaceted and complex; one operationalization of 
feedback did not exist, and (2) that there was no guiding theoretical foundation to direct 
research in an efficient manner. They created a model in order to address the second issue 
(see Figure 1). However, they do note that their model was developed as an organizing 
framework rather than a theory, per se: “it [their model] is meant to serve primarily as a 
vehicle for organizing the discussion of feedback rather than to be a well-developed 
theory of feedback” (p. 352). Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen (1980) later expanded the 
model to encompass all organizational behavior, but did not get much attention from 
researchers. The original (1979) model often is cited as a theory in its own right—Fedor 
(1991) notes that this model is the most frequently used.  
Control Theory.  Another highly influential theory in the feedback literature is 
control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981), the basis of which asserts that behavior can be 
understood as a series of negative feedback loops: standards of behavior and actual 
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behavior are compared—any discrepancy between the two encourages the individual to 
reduce the discrepancy through his or her future behavior. A discrepancy between 
feedback and standards can be reduced in four ways: by changing behavior to reduce 
future discrepancy, by changing the standard to match current feedback, by rejecting the 
feedback outright, or by exiting the situation, either physically or mentally. Taylor, 
Fisher, and Ilgen (1984) merged their earlier model (Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor, 1979) with 
control theory as a method of understanding individual’s reactions to performance 
feedback. Control theory, to the authors, explained the structure of standard hierarchies 
and emphasized important aspects of the feedback process (e.g., congruence between 
feedback dimensions and behavioral standards). However, other researchers did not find 
the value of control theory in understanding human behavior. 
Goal Setting Theory.  Goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002) is, at 
its surface (in terms of how feedback is used by the recipient), very similar to control 
theory. Both theories suggest that a difference between feedback and standards influence 
behavior. Similarly, the four behavioral options for responses to discrepancies in goal 
setting theory mimic those in control theory: an individual can strive to attain the goal, 
change the goal, reject the feedback, or abandon commitment to the goal. However, 
control theorists suggest that the individual is motivated by reducing the discrepancy, 
whereas goal setting theorists suggest that the individual is motivated by achieving the 
goal. This difference is somewhat subtle, but stems from the difference in foundation of 
the two theories: control theory developed as a result of mechanical systems building, of 
machine building. Goal theory, on the other hand, arose after an empirical review of 
human behavior. Locke (1991) provided a detailed comparison of the two theories, and 
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outlined many reasons why he felt that control theory was not applicable to 
understanding human motivation—one of the major arguments suggests that humans do 
not simply attempt to reduce discrepancies between goal states and current states, but in 
fact are at times discrepancy-producing. That is, “discrepancy reduction actually is a 
consequence of goal-directed behavior, not its cause” (Locke, 1991 p. 13, emphasis 
original). However, while goal setting theory is related to feedback—and explicitly 
incorporates it as an element—it is not explicitly a theory about feedback as an 
organizational intervention. 
Feedback Intervention Theory.  Feedback Intervention Theory (FIT; Kluger & 
DeNisi, 1996) was developed to incorporate elements of pre-existing theories related to 
feedback in order to explain the inconsistent findings of effectiveness for organizational 
feedback interventions (FIs) on increasing job performance. The five basic tenets of this 
theory are: (1) that behavior is regulated by comparison of feedback to goals or standards, 
(2) these goals and standards are arranged hierarchically, (3) attention is limited, 
therefore only discrepancies between standards and performance that are given attention 
will dictate future behavior, (4) attention is typically directed at a moderate level of the 
goal hierarchy, and (5) the main purpose of FIs is to change the locus of attention and 
therefore influence behavior (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996, p. 259). The first four arguments 
come almost directly from control theory and goal setting theory (and each have their 
own empirical support), but the last one, they argue, is unique to FIT and critical for 
understanding the relationship between feedback and performance.  
Their theory reduces down to the supposition that feedback can orient the 
attention of the recipient to either themselves (“meta-task goals”), the task at hand, or to 
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certain components of the task at hand, and these “goals” are arranged hierarchically. 
Feedback that directs attention toward meta-task goals was posited to attenuate the 
relationship between feedback and performance, particularly through a diversion of 
cognitive resources away from performance and toward affective responses. Feedback 
that directs the recipient to the task at hand would be associated with increased 
motivation, and therefore increased performance. Feedback that directs attention to task 
details would increase learning, and therefore performance. The relationship between 
feedback characteristics (“cues”) and the level of the goal hierarchy to which it directs the 
recipient would be influenced by both situational and personality variables. Similarly, the 
relationship between attention to the goal and subsequent performance would be 
influenced by task characteristic variables. A graphic representation of this model can be 
found in Figure 2. 
Evidence for Effectiveness 
Several reviews of the feedback literature have been conducted over its history to 
assess whether or not it is effective at changing behavior (e.g., reducing absenteeism, 
increasing job performance). Early reviewers simply tallied the number of studies on the 
topic according to the direction of their result. Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1985) 
reviewed the feedback literature published in four major journals from 1975 to 1985: 
Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, Journal of 
Applied Psychology, and Journal of Organizational Behavior Management. They found 
that in most studies, feedback did not uniformly improve performance—only 28% of the 
129 instances of feedback interventions that they found consistently increased 
performance. Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) reviewed the same journals from 1985 
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to 1998 and found similar results: 47% of their located studies of feedback consistently 
increased performance.  
Other reviewers have focused on the effectiveness of specific intervention 
systems which incorporate a feedback element. Management by objectives (MBO) is a 
system of performance management which has three main components: goal setting, 
participative decision making, and objective feedback (Drucker, 1976). Rodgers and 
Hunter (1991) found positive results of an MBO system on productivity in 97% of their 
located studies—a substantial positive effect (d = 0.42) was also found in the 12 studies 
that used performance rating data.  Pritchard, Harrell, Diaz Granados, and Guzman 
(2008) conducted a meta-analysis on studies of the Productivity Measurement and 
Enhancement System (ProMES)—a method which defines organizational objectives and 
indicators of progress toward the objectives, followed by feedback reports and a feedback 
meeting. They found that this intervention was overall effective at increasing 
performance (d = 1.16), particularly after the feedback portion of the intervention had 
begun. 
Smither, London, and Reilly (2005) conducted a meta-analysis on longitudinal 
studies of performance feedback—specifically longitudinal studies of multisource 
feedback. Although their located study size was small (k = 21), they found modest effect 
sizes for both upward feedback (i.e., from a direct report to a manger; d = 0.24) and 
multisource feedback (d = 0.24). The most comprehensive, and most definitive, meta-
analysis of the feedback literature was conducted by Kluger and DeNisi (1996). They 
included only studies which examined the effects of performance feedback alone, 
included a control group (or a quasi-control group), measured performance, and had 10 or 
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more participants—resulting in 131 studies yielding 607 effect sizes calculated from 
12,652 participants. They found a reasonably high uncorrected effect size (d = 0.41) for 
feedback interventions, but the distribution of effect sizes was highly variable (σ = 0.97); 
33% of the effect sizes were negative, even after exclusion of a set of potentially 
questionable studies by one researcher. Therefore, the search for moderators was 
necessary. 
Moderators. Researchers have also examined the effects of various moderating 
variables on the relationship between feedback interventions and their ability to change 
behavior. Some of these moderators are characteristics of the feedback itself (e.g., source, 
valence, and frequency) while others are characteristics of the environment.  
Combination.  In many organizational settings, performance feedback is used in 
conjunction with other interventions such as goal setting and behavioral consequences. 
The studies reviewed by Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1985) that used other 
interventions in addition to feedback had more consistently positive results than those 
that used feedback alone. Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) replicated these results in 
their review of the literature in the 1990s. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found a moderator 
effect of goal setting use in addition to feedback such that goal setting improves 
performance (d = 0.51) to a greater degree than feedback without it (d = 0.30). 
These results have been confirmed in more recent investigations as well. For 
example, in a confirmatory factor analysis, Jawahar (2010) found evidence for a direct 
effect of feedback used in conjunction with goal setting on job performance of employees 
in a software company. Goal setting is not the only intervention that has been studied: 
Anseel, Lievens, and Schollaert (2009) examined the effects of reflection on subsequent 
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task performance. They asked some participants to reflect on their previous performance 
by writing down what they thought they had done well and what they had done poorly 
(along with behavioral examples of each). They found that feedback increased 
performance, reflection without feedback did not improve performance, but reflection 
coupled with feedback increased performance over and above feedback alone.  
Source.  The source of the feedback also has been found to impact the 
effectiveness of the feedback. Balcazar (1985) found that studies with feedback from 
supervisors were more likely to have consistent positive effects (50%) than studies with 
feedback from the researchers (33%) or from participants themselves (21%). Similar 
results (59% in supervisory feedback, 50% in researcher generated feedback) were found 
by Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001). In contrast, Smither, London, and Reilly (2005) 
found that the longitudinal effects of feedback were strongest for feedback from direct 
reports and peers (both d = 0.15, corrected for unreliability and sampling error), weak for 
feedback from supervisors (d = 0.07), and basically non-existent for feedback from the 
self (d = 0.03).  
Other researchers have investigated characteristics of the source other than their 
relative organizational standing (i.e., peer versus direct report versus supervisor). Fedor, 
Davis, Maslyn, and Mathieson (2001) examined the effects of the French and Raven 
(1959) bases of power of the rater on performance improvement following feedback. 
They found a positive association between performance improvement and managerial 
possession of both expert power and referent power and a negative relationship between 
possession of reward power and performance improvement. Similarly, Kinicki, Prussia, 
12 
Wu, and McKee-Ryan (2004) found that the perceived credibility of the feedback source 
was positively related (through other mediating variables) to job performance. 
Valence.  Whether the feedback is generally positive or generally negative has 
been suggested as a potential moderator of its effectiveness. In their entire sample of 
studies, Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that the sign of the feedback was correlated with 
effect size (r = 0.24), but after removing suspected studies
2
 the effect went away (r = -
0.01).  Studies conducted after data collection by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that 
self-ratings of performance increased after receipt of positive feedback (Atwater, Roush, 
& Fischthal, 1995; Bailey & Austin, 2006). Evidence also suggests that supervisory 
ratings of later performance is positively associated with receipt of positive feedback 
(Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, & McKee-Ryan, 2004; Zheng, Diaz, Jing, & Chiaburu, 2015).  
Researchers have found that negative feedback has produced decreases in self-
ratings but increases in follower ratings (Atwarer, Roush, & Fischthal, 1995). Also, 
Brutus, London, and Martineau (1999) found that receiving negative feedback was 
associated with increased goal-setting behavior. Others found that valence of the 
feedback had no effect on future performance (Atwater, Waldman, Atwater, & Cartier, 
2000; Vancouver & Tischner, 2004) or on engagement in developmental activity (Bailey 
& Austin, 2006). However, research has also shown that positive feedback is seen as 
more accurate (Brett & Atwater, 2001) and is generally more accepted by the ratee 
(Facteau, Facteau, Schoel, Russel, & Poteet, 1998) than is negative feedback.  
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 Kluger and DeNisi (1996) decided to include variations of their analyses with excluded studies 
conducted by a researcher named Mikulincer—their studies provided estimates that were outliers and were 
therefore considered suspect by the authors. 
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Frequency. Salmoni, Schmidt, and Walter (1984) were among the first to 
conclude that more feedback was more effective than less feedback—particularly for 
tasks without intrinsic feedback (i.e., tasks for which progress cannot be marked without 
external consultation). However, much of this research was conducted on the 
performance of physical or motor tasks, usually in the laboratory.  Reviews of studies of 
the frequency of job performance feedback have been less conclusive. Balcazar, Hopkins, 
and Suarez (1985) found an even split in the number of studies that found consistent 
effects and mixed effects of feedback in both studies of daily and weekly feedback.  
Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) had even less conclusive results, finding considerable 
evidence for effectiveness of feedback in studies of daily and monthly feedback, but not 
in those of weekly feedback.  
Meta-analyses in this area have also yielded inconclusive results. After removal of 
suspect studies, Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found a modest, but significant, positive 
correlation between the frequency of feedback and its effectiveness (r = 0.15). However, 
they conclude that the effect is likely an artifact; when feedback frequency was 
dichotomized (by taking studies from the top and bottom quartiles of feedback frequency) 
less frequent feedback was found to be more effective (d = 0.39) than more frequent 
feedback (d = 0.32). Smither, London, and Reilly (2005) found that the degree of 
performance improvement after feedback appeared greater when reassessment came less 
than one year after the initial measurement than when it came one year or longer after the 
initial measurement.  
Lam, DeRue, Karam, and Hollenbeck (2011) had participants complete a 
simulation task and found that there was no significant direct relationship between 
14 
feedback frequency as a predictor of the outcomes of task performance and task effort. 
However, they did find a significant curvilinear relationship between feedback frequency 
and the two dependent variables after controlling for participant gender, race, and 
feedback sign, such that initial increases in feedback frequency improved task 
performance and effort but “too much” feedback decreased performance and effort. It 
should be noted, however, that this investigation was conducted on a relatively small 
sample (N = 86). Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, and McKee-Ryan (2004) found a positive 
correlation between the frequency of feedback and job performance (r = 0.30). 
Immediacy.  Early researchers in feedback—specifically Knowledge of Results 
(KR) feedback—spent much time on examining the effect of the duration of delay 
between actual performance and the receipt of feedback on its effectiveness (Salmoni, 
Schmidt, and Walter, 1984). Results generally indicated that there was no effect of 
feedback delay on subsequent performance. This concept has been studied with great 
interest in education—Kulik and Kulik (1988) in their meta-analysis first noted that 
immediate feedback was more effective than delayed feedback when the feedback was 
given after each item (i.e., given immediately after the item was responded to versus with 
a few seconds delay after responding; d = 0.55) but when feedback was only given at the 
end of the test, immediate feedback was associated with decreased performance relative 
to delayed feedback (i.e., at test completion versus after a day). These results have been 
replicated a number of times (e.g., Fajfar, Campitelli, & Labolita, 2012). A parallel 
example in I-O psychology might be that feedback immediately after completion of a 
subordinate (i.e., low-level) goal might be more effective than delayed feedback, but 
delayed feedback after completion of a superordinate goal might be most effective. 
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Northcraft, Schmidt, and Ashford (2011) recently tested the transference of the 
effect of immediacy of feedback on relative resource allocation toward multiple goals. 
They found a main effect of immediacy on resource allocation such that participants 
worked more toward goals for which there was timely (i.e., more immediate) feedback. A 
main effect of immediacy was also found on task performance, such that performance on 
the task was higher under well-timed feedback conditions than in less timely feedback. 
They also found interaction effects between feedback specificity and feedback timeliness 
such that for vague feedback, immediacy had no effect; while timing had a significant 
positive relationship with performance and resource allocation under conditions of 
specific feedback. 
Researchers have further investigated this phenomenon in field samples. Kuvaas, 
Buch, and Dysvik (2016) examined the relationships between perceived immediacy and 
frequency of supervisory performance feedback (assessed as one measure, i.e., quality), 
perceived constructiveness of the feedback, and subsequent job performance. They found 
evidence for an interaction effect of perceived feedback quality and perceived 
constructiveness on job performance, but no main effect of perceived feedback quality on 
job performance after controlling for gender, education, and tenure. The interaction was 
such that there was no relationship between constructiveness and work performance in 
individuals that perceived their feedback to be low in quality, but there was a positive 
relationship in individuals that perceived their feedback to be high in quality. 
Specificity.   Feedback specificity refers to the amount of information that is 
presented in feedback messages—it is related to the directive purpose of feedback 
(Bilodeau, 1966). Early research (e.g., Goldstein, Emanuel, & Howell, 1968; Johnson, 
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Perlow, & Pieper, 1993) found evidence that more specific feedback could result in 
increased job performance. This finding was further cemented by Kluger and DeNisi 
(1996)—feedback which provided the correct solution (i.e., that is more specific) was 
more effective at increasing job performance (d = 0.43) than feedback that did not 
provide the solution (d = 0.25). Davis, Carson, Ammeter, and Treadway (2005) found 
that high specificity feedback was much more highly correlated with performance than 
moderately specific feedback. Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, and McKee-Ryan (2004) found a 
significant positive relationship between feedback specificity and job performance (r = 
0.24). Recent results from Northcraft, Schmidt, and Ashford (2011) found that resources 
tended to be allocated toward tasks with specific feedback available in addition to 
performance in those tasks tending to be higher. 
Goodman and colleagues (Goodman & Wood, 2004; Goodman, Wood, & 
Hendricks, 2004) have examined the effects of feedback specificity during practice on 
both performance during the practice task and subsequent performance on a related task 
(i.e., learning). They have generally found that more specific feedback is positively 
related to performance on the task for which it is generated, but does not necessarily 
affect subsequent learning. Goodman and Wood (2004) found that specific feedback was 
effective at teaching good performers that what they were doing was correct (i.e., 
participants doing mostly the right thing increased their correct behavior on the learning 
task), but was not effective at teaching poor performers what they were doing wrong (i.e., 
participants doing mostly the wrong thing did not correct their behavior for the learning 
task).  
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Task Type.  Kluger and DeNisi (1996) noted that feedback researchers had, for the 
most part, ignored the effect of the type of the task as a potential moderator of feedback’s 
effectiveness. They hypothesized that the fewer the cognitive resources necessary for task 
performance (i.e., the simpler the task), the stronger the relationship between feedback 
and performance. Indeed, they found that task complexity was negatively related to the 
effect size (r = -0.11) but also found that feedback had much less of an effect on 
improving performance on physical tasks (d = -0.11) than on non-physical tasks (d = 
0.36) and a greater effect on memory tasks (d = 0.69) than on non-memory tasks (d = 
0.30). Similarly, Pritchard, Harrell, DiazGranados, and Guzman (2008) found that the 
ProMES system had the greatest effect sizes in studies of technical jobs (d = 2.15), 
followed by academic and managerial jobs (d = 1.74), and blue collar jobs (d = 1.54), and 
it was least effective in clerical jobs (d = 0.27). In contrast, Pritchard et al. also found that 
ProMES was least effective in manufacturing organizations (d = 1.05) and most effective 
in either sales (d = 1.45) or service organizations (d = 1.63).    
Only one study directly examining the effects of task complexity on performance 
improvement published since the literature search by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) was 
found. Korsgaard and Diddams (1996) examined the interactive effects of task 
complexity and feedback availability on performance improvement. They found that for 
less complex tasks, the availability of feedback did not affect performance improvement. 
In the complex task condition, they found that participants only showed significant 
performance improvement if both process and outcome feedback
3
 were available 
(compared to conditions where only outcome feedback was available). Van Dijk and 
                                                 
3
 Process and outcome feedback to be discussed in detail below 
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Kluger (2004; 2011) examined the moderating effects of the regulatory focus of tasks 
(i.e., prevention-focused versus promotion-focused
4
) on the relationship between 
feedback and performance improvement. They found no significant interaction effect of 
task type on feedback and performance improvement. However, they did find an 
interaction effect between task type and feedback sign on performance such that negative 
feedback increased performance for a prevention-focused task but decreased performance 
on a promotion-focused task. Inversely, positive feedback increased performance on a 
promotion-focused task but decreased performance on a prevention-focused task. 
Medium.  The method by which feedback is conveyed was studied with some 
regularity in the early days of feedback research. Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1986) 
found that there were more consistently positive effects in studies of graphic feedback 
(i.e., including illustrations; 54%) than there were in studies of written (32%) or verbal 
(24%) feedback. Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) found similar results—studies that 
combined either verbal or written feedback with graphs had more consistently positive 
effects than did methods without them. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that verbal 
feedback was less effective (d = 0.23) than non-verbal feedback (d = 0.37), but no 
significant effects for graphical or written feedback. They also compared computerized 
versus non-computerized feedback, finding that computerized was more effective (d = 
0.41) than non-computerized feedback (d = 0.23).  Later, Adler and Ambrose (2005) 
found that feedback given in a face-to-face setting (rather than through a computer) was 
                                                 
4
 A prevention-focused task is one that is framed by preventing a loss (e.g., working at a job that you have 
to keep), whereas a promotion-focused task is on that is framed by gains and accomplishments (e.g., 
working at a job that you desired to have). 
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positively associated with job performance (albeit indirectly, through perceived fairness 
of the feedback). 
Privacy.  FIT suggests that because it would threaten self-esteem, public display 
of feedback would decrease subsequent performance. However, research findings suggest 
otherwise. Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1985) found no real difference in the 
consistency of effects in studies of feedback for public, private, or some combination of 
the two.  These findings were replicated in Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001), with a 
small positive effect for feedback interventions using a mixture of public and private 
elements (however there were only 10 studies). Initial meta-analytic estimates from 
Kulger and DeNisi (1996) suggested that public feedback interventions had a greater 
effect than private (correlation with d = 0.20), but after exclusions of suspect studies, the 
effect was rendered non-significant (correlation with d = 0.06). 
Mediators.  Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) supposed that there were a number 
of mediating processes between feedback and subsequent performance: perceptions of the 
feedback, acceptance of the feedback, desire to respond to the feedback, and an intention 
to respond to the feedback. They reviewed the early research on these variables, and 
recent investigations have further confirmed the existence of these mediating factors. For 
example, Jawahar (2010) found that the ratee’s perceived accuracy of the feedback, 
perceived utility of the feedback, and the satisfaction with the feedback partially 
mediated the effect of feedback characteristics on job performance. Similarly, Anseel and 
Lievens (2009) found that feedback acceptance partially mediated the relationship 
between feedback and subsequent performance. Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, and McKee-Ryan 
(2004) explicitly tested the Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) model of feedback in a 
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sample of bank employees and found evidence for positive, mediated relationships 
between perceived accuracy, desire to respond, intent to respond, and performance.  
Measurement Considerations 
The measurement of job performance as a criterion in selection has been a 
concern in Industrial/Organizational psychology since perhaps its inception (Blum & 
Naylor, 1968). Early work focused on finding the “ultimate criterion... the complete final 
goal of a particular type of selection or training” (Thorndike, 1949, p.121)—which most 
interpreted to mean it were possible to obtain one single measure that could wholly define 
job success in a given position. It was not until Dunnette (1963) told the field to “junk the 
criterion!” (emphasis in original, p. 252) in favor of building an understanding of the 
meaning of performance—with an emphasis on behavior—that researchers began to 
consider multiple criteria. Then, in the 1980s, researchers began to consider job 
performance as a multidimensional psychological construct deserving study of its own 
(Campbell, 2012). As a result of this work (e.g., Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 
1993; Yukl, Gordon, & Taber, 2002), much attention has been given to its measurement. 
Campbell (2012) briefly described a number of measurement considerations in 
performance ratings which will be discussed in detail, along with other concerns not 
mentioned, in the sections below. 
Instrument Concerns 
In order to conduct a performance appraisal, there is typically some formal 
method or instrument of feedback collection. There are many considerations when 
designing a feedback instrument for performance appraisal, reviewed below. Specifically, 
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evidence for changes in rating behavior (e.g., leniency or severity) based on qualities of 
the measurement instrument will be reviewed.  
Item and Scale Complexity.  Viswesvaran, Ones, and Schmidt (1996) first noted 
the counterintuitive finding that for job performance ratings, an increase in the number of 
items did not seem to substantially increase intrarater or interrater reliability. They 
offered two potential explanations: (1) that the relationship between the number of items 
and reliability is convex such that after a scale reaches a certain length there are minimal 
gains in increased reliability or (2) that the broad nature of the job performance construct 
leads to more reliable ratings, as broad constructs had been shown to be more reliably 
rated than narrower ones (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996). Not long thereafter, Greguras and 
Robie (1998) found similar results in their study of multisource feedback ratings—an 
increase in the number of items from three to twenty yielded minimal increases in 
reliability—as much as 0.09—when the number of raters was held constant. Wanous and 
Hudy (2001) later estimated the minimum reliability of a single-item, individual level 
performance measure at a reasonably high level (0.70).  
Relatedly, the amount of inter-rater agreement in job performance ratings seems 
mostly unaffected by the number of items on the scale. Conway and Huffcutt (1997) 
found nearly identical reliabilities of job performance ratings made by supervisors, peers, 
and subordinates whether the scale was a composite or a rating of overall performance. 
Heidemeier and Moser (2009) replicated these findings in their meta-analysis of job 
performance ratings: agreement between self and supervisor ratings of performance was 
about the same for single-item measures of performance (ρ = 0.34) as it was for 
aggregated measures (ρ = 0.32).  
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A few researchers have investigated the complexity of the item itself as a source 
of rating variability. Brutus and Facteau (2003) examined the effects of item syntax (i.e., 
complexity), double-barreledness, linguistic specificity, and behavioral specificity on the 
psychometric quality (operationalized as the amount of variance in the item that was 
accounted for by the factor it was intended to measure) of multisource feedback items. 
They only found a negative effect of item syntax on item quality—more linguistically 
complex items were less related to the factor they were intended to measure. Kaiser and 
Craig (2005) examined the same variables (with the exception of linguistic specificity) 
but used interrater reliability and agreement as their outcome variables. They found no 
effect of any of the variables on interrater agreement, but did find that multi-barreledness 
and abstraction (i.e., low behavioral specificity) were negatively related to interrater 
reliability of peers and subordinates. In a related study, Roch, Paquin, and Littlejohn 
(2009) surprisingly found that items that were rated as less behaviorally observable (by 
upper-level PhD students) had higher levels of agreement than did more behaviorally 
observable items. 
Topic.  The content of the measurement instrument is also an important 
consideration to make. Annett (1969) first distinguished between feedback that concerned 
the outcomes of actions and feedback about the actions themselves. This distinction later 
became known as process feedback and outcome feedback (Earley, Northcraft, Lee, and 
Lituchy, 1990). Earley et al. (1990) examined the interactive effects of the type of 
feedback given and goal setting on task performance and found that the highest level of 
performance was associated with having both a specific, challenging goal as well as 
having access to both types of feedback. Also, as previously mentioned, Korsgaard and 
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Diddams (1996) they found that participants only showed significant performance 
improvement in a complex task if both process and outcome feedback were available 
(compared to conditions where only outcome feedback was available).  
The dimensionality of the assessment also been considered. Harris and 
Schaubroeck (1988) found that there was slightly higher agreement between self- and 
supervisory-ratings of job performance for dimensional (ρ = 0.36) than for global ratings 
(ρ = 0.29). They found a moderator effect of dimensionality on agreement between peer-
supervisor ratings, but in the opposite direction (ρ = 0.57 for dimensional and ρ = 0.65 for 
global ratings). No effect of dimensionality on the agreement between self- and peer-
ratings of performance was found. Later, Heidemeier and Moser (2009) found that for 
single-item measures, self-other agreement was similar for global performance items (ρ = 
0.33) as it was for specific performance dimension items (ρ = 0.34).  
Other variables related to the content of the instrument have been examined, with 
somewhat less research interest. For example, the reviews by Balcazar et al. (1985) and 
Alvero et al. (2001) both examined the consistency in effectiveness of various 
combinations of feedback content (e.g., individual versus group performance, whether a 
standard of performance was included, and whether normative information was present) 
but found little differences. Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) also looked at the effect of 
trait-based versus behaviorally based ratings on self-other agreement and found that 
behaviorally-based scales had higher agreement for self-supervisor ratings (ρ = 0.43) than 
did trait-based scales (ρ = 0.32). For peer-supervisor agreement the opposite was found: 
there was more agreement in trait-based scales (ρ = 0.64) than in behaviorally-based 
scales (ρ = 0.53). Again, no interaction effect was found for self-peer agreement. 
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Response Scale.  Researchers have been interested in the differences in ratings 
stemming from the response scale of the instrument for a long time (e.g., Taylor & 
Wherry, 1951). Landy and Farr (1980) noted that much of the research in the 
performance appraisal space at the time was conducted on the differential effectiveness of 
different rating formats. After a review of the research on graphic rating scales (GRS, 
Paterson, 1922), behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS, Smith & Kendall, 1963), 
behavioral observation scales (BOS, Latham & Wexley, 1977), and forced choice (FC) 
scales, they conclude that “after more than 30 years of serious research, it seems that little 
progress has been made in developing an efficient and psychometrically sound alternative 
to the traditional graphic rating scale” (p. 89). They went on to say that only 4%-8% of 
the variance in performance ratings could be explained by the format—they even 
suggested a “moratorium on format-related research” (p. 101). Many researchers heeded 
this call. Others did not. 
Research published near the time of Landy and Farr’s (1980) review confirmed 
their assertion of relative equivalence of rating scales. Fay and Latham (1982) found no 
difference between BOS and BARS in terms of reducing rater errors. Murphy, Martin, 
and Garcia (1982) found that when performance was recalled after some delay, there was 
no difference in ratings made in BOS and in GRS. However, a later meta-analysis 
conducted by Jawahar and Williams (1997) found that the difference between ratings 
made for administrative purposes and those made for research purposes was the smallest 
for ratings with BARS (d = 0.03), followed by those made with FC scales (d = 0.18), and 
largest for ratings with GRS (d = 0.34). Other recent research has found that rater 
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personality had less of an effect on ratings made on behavioral checklists than it did on 
ratings made on GRS (Yun, Donahue, Dudley, & McFarland, 2005). 
Other researchers have taken time to develop new rating scale formats in order to 
improve the psychometric quality of performance ratings. Borman, Buck, Hanson, 
Motowidlo, Stark, and Drasgow (2001) developed the Computerized Adaptive Rating 
Scale (CARS) format specifically to improve criterion measurement in I-O Psychology. 
In their example, they created a CARS measure of citizenship performance (i.e., 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, OCB; Organ, 1988). The basic methodology is 
borrowed from computerized adaptive testing (CAT; Weiss, 2011). In this case, item 
parameters were generated by subject matter experts rather than by algorithm. For each of 
the three OCB dimensions, up to 15 pairs of behavioral statements were shown to 
respondents, and they were asked to select which was more accurate in describing the 
ratee. In terms of inter-rater reliability, the CARS format (ICC2,1 = 0.78) was marginally 
larger than it was for the BARS (ICC2,1 = 0.74) and GRS (ICC2,1 = 0.73) formats. 
However, validity (i.e., the accuracy of the raters’ rank order) was considerably higher in 
the CARS condition (r = 0.84) than it was in either BARS (r = 0.49) or GRS (r = 0.72) 
conditions. They also found that all four of Cronbach’s (1955) measures of rating 
accuracy
5
 were better in the CARS condition than in the other measurement format 
conditions. Schneider, Goff, Anderson, and Borman (2003) expanded the CARS 
methodology to measure managerial performance, but unfortunately did not empirically 
test the format against others. 
                                                 
5
 Described in detail in the “Rater Concerns” section 
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Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996) developed the balanced scorecard (BSC) format. 
Originally, it was created to give top-level managers a quick and comprehensive view of 
their organization’s performance. Basically, a BSC provides an individual with 
organizational goals and performance metrics in four areas: finance, internal business, 
innovation and learning, and customer perspectives. Researchers later developed BSCs at 
the individual level and examined how these systems might influence the eventual 
performance appraisal of subordinates (e.g., Banker, Chang, & Pizzini, 2004; Kaplan, 
Peterson, & Samuels, 2007). However, the applicability of this system outside of specific 
job domains (e.g., accounting) has limited the research potential of this rating format. 
Very few studies have examined the role of narrative comments in the feedback 
process. Smither and Walker (2004) examined the role of the number, focus, and 
favorability of comments in a multisource feedback intervention on performance 
improvement. They found that individuals improved the most under conditions of a low 
number of comments that were unfavorable, that were about behaviors or tasks rather 
than about traits.  In contrast, individuals with a high number of unfavorable comments 
about behaviors or tasks tended to decrease in performance. David (2013) found similar 
results in a sample of nurses—receipt of favorable comments and comments with high 
levels of interactional justice (i.e., treating the employee with dignity, respect, kindness, 
and consideration) was positively related to a measure of performance collected one year 
later. However, she found no effect for comment length, specificity, or whether it 
contained content specific to a performance goal. Somewhat tangentially, Wilson (2010) 
content-analyzed the comments that accompanied numerical ratings of a sample of hotel 
staff employees to examine the differences in supervisory comments across ratee ethnic 
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groups. She found that supervisors tended to give positive comments, regardless of the 
numerical rating that they gave. That is, there was no substantial difference in the content 
of comments made to higher performers and those given to low performers. She also 
found that mention of interpersonal and social factors of performance were more likely to 
occur in appraisals of minority (i.e., Black or Asian) employees (David, 2013). 
The response scale of the performance appraisal instrument has also been linked 
to goal-setting behavior. Tziner and Kopelman (1988) found that ratings made on a BOS 
yielded higher levels of goal acceptance, goal commitment, and goal clarity than did 
ratings made on a GRS. Tziner, Kopelman, and Joanis (1997) found that the clarity of the 
path to the goal, goal acceptance, goal commitment, and goal specificity were all rated 
higher under ratings given in BOS scales than those in either BARS or GRS. In contrast, 
Tziner, Joanis, and Murphy (2000) found that although ratees were more satisfied with 
ratings made with BOS than with BARS, ratings made on a GRS were as good as BOS 
and as good or better than BARS in terms of goal specificity, goal observability, and 
ratee’s perceptions of goals. 
Medium.  The method by which the feedback is communicated has been 
suggested to play a part in the accuracy of performance ratings. Specifically, some have 
hypothesized that feedback that is delivered face-to-face may be more challenging for a 
rater than delivery via a non-face-to-face vehicle. Indeed, Klimoski and Inks (1990) 
found that individuals that expected to deliver their feedback anonymously were 
considerably more strict (i.e., more accurate in their ratings) than individuals that 
expected to deliver their feedback face-to-face. Waung and Highhouse (1997) also 
showed that when participants expected to give their feedback in a face-to-face setting, 
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they were more likely to give positive feedback than when they expected to give 
feedback indirectly (through a video-taped recording, in this instance).  
In contrast, Smither, Walker, and Yap (2004), in a study of upward feedback, 
looked for a potential elevation effect when managers selected that their subordinates 
give them feedback via the company’s intranet compared to “traditional” paper-and-
pencil feedback. Initial results suggested that ratings were more favorable for online than 
paper-pencil versions (d = 0.38), but after accounting for rater and ratee characteristics 
(e.g., age, tenure), this effect was diminished. Similarly, Yun, Donahue, Dudley, and 
McFarland (2005) found no direct effect of medium (face-to-face, identified versus 
aggregated, anonymous feedback) on rating elevation. However, a three-way interaction 
between performance level of the ratee, agreeableness of the rater, and medium was 
found.  Raters of low performers that were high on agreeableness elevated their scores 
more when they were not expecting to give face-to-face feedback; those that were low on 
agreeableness elevated their ratings more when they were expecting to give face-to-face 
feedback. For raters of moderate performers, the effect was reversed. Raters of high 
performers that were high on agreeableness elevated their ratings when they expected to 
give face-to-face feedback—those that were low on agreeableness were unaffected by the 
feedback medium. 
Other researchers have examined more distal variables in relation to feedback 
medium. Adler (2007) examined the effects of feedback that was provided by computer 
or provided by a supervisor on the perceived interpersonal fairness of the feedback. He 
found a non-significant direct effect of source on fairness perceptions, but did find an 
interaction effect of constructiveness (i.e., inconsiderate, general versus specific, non-
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threatening) and source on fairness—under conditions of constructive feedback, getting 
feedback from the supervisor was perceived as more fair than getting it from the 
computer. There was no difference in perceived feedback fairness in the destructive 
feedback condition. Au and Chan (2013) compared the relative preferences of employees 
in Hong Kong for using face-to-face, telephone, email, or written communication 
methods to provide feedback. They found that individuals that were low in 
communication orientation were more likely to use email or written feedback; face-to 
face and written feedback was more likely to be used when communicating with 
subordinates and the phone was more likely to be used with peers; positive feedback was 
more likely to be conveyed via phone, email, or via written communication.  
Contextual Concerns. 
Performance appraisals do not happen in a vacuum—they are conducted within 
the context of not only the immediate relationship between manager and supervisor, but 
also within that of the team and organization. Landy and Farr (1980), in their review of 
the performance-appraisal literature, mention that context is an important component in 
performance appraisal, but also note that the amount of research in the space is limited. 
Furthermore, Murphy and Cleveland (1995) observed that: “the effects of context 
variables on appraisal processes and outcomes have been the object of speculation but 
have not been empirically examined in the detail that these effects warrant” (p. 407). 
Their call to action seems to have been effective—Levy and Williams (2004) and Ferris, 
Munyon, Basik, and Buckley (2008) were able to procure sufficient research on the topic 
to conduct substantive literature reviews on context effects in performance appraisal, and 
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research in this space has continued. An overview of their findings, and a review of the 
literature since that time, will continue below.  
Purpose.  Meyer, Kay, and French (1965) noted the inherent multiplicity in 
purpose of performance appraisal in applied settings—they are designed to both provide 
justification for administrative decisions (e.g., salary increases, promotions) and 
simultaneously motivate the employee to improve their performance. They noted that 
often “the traditional appraisal system essentially becomes a salary discussion in which 
the manager justifies the action taken” (Meyer, Kay, & French, 1965, p. 129). Cleveland, 
Murphy, and Williams (1989) provided some data to further illustrate this point. 
Responses from a survey of Society of Industrial Organizational Psychology (SIOP) 
members suggested that most organizations frequently—and simultaneously—use 
performance appraisals for four distinct purposes: (1) to compare between individuals on 
their performance level, (2) to identify potential strengths and weaknesses within an 
individual, (3) to implement and evaluate human resource systems and interventions, and 
(4) to document or justify personnel decisions. 
Taylor and Wherry (1951) were among the first to hypothesize that performance 
appraisal ratings made for administrative purposes would be more lenient than ratings for 
other purposes. A meta-analysis of the literature confirmed this suspicion: Jawahar and 
Williams (1997) found strong empirical support for an effect of purpose on leniency 
(mean unweighted d = 0.25) such that administrative ratings were substantially higher 
than research or developmental ratings. Ratings that were made in the field (i.e., by actual 
managers of actual employees) were considerably inflated (mean unweighted d = 0.32). 
These results have also been replicated in a laboratory setting (Curtis, Harvey, & Ravden, 
31 
2005) Harahi, Rudolph, and Laginess (2015) further found that personality of the rater 
generally has a greater influence on the level of rating given in administrative contexts 
than it does in research and developmental contexts.  
Relatedly, Heidemeier and Moser (2009) found that agreement between self-
ratings and supervisory ratings was highest in administrative conditions (ρ = 0.42), 
followed by research settings (ρ = 0.35), then in conditions of explicitly combined 
purposes (ρ = 0.32), then in those made for developmental purposes (ρ = 0.24). Finally, 
Smither, London, and Reilly (2005) demonstrated that feedback given in a developmental 
context was more effective at improving performance (d = 0.25) than that given in an 
administrative context (d = 0.08)—regardless of the source of the feedback (i.e., 
supervisor, peer, or direct report). Most recently, Ellington and Wilson (2016) found that 
the level of supervisory ratings was considerably higher in administrative settings than in 
developmental settings in a police department. 
Prior Information.  Murphy, Balzer, Lockhart, and Eisenman (1985) were 
among the first to consider the potential for contrast and assimilation effects in the 
performance appraisal process. Information about past performance was hypothesized to 
impact ratings of present performance in one of two ways: (1) present evaluations are 
biased in an opposite direction to previous performance (a contrast effect) or (2) present 
evaluations are biased toward the direction of previous performance (an assimilation 
effect). In their study, they found strong contrast effects for previous performance 
ratings—individuals that “improved” in their performance were rated higher than 
individuals that “declined” in performance. However, after they delayed the observation 
of previous and present performance, the effect went away. Mero and Motowidlo (1995) 
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found that when raters were told that the person they were rating had been rated “too 
low” in the past rated their subordinates more favorably—demonstrating evidence for a 
contrast effect. However, Salvemini, Reilly, and Smither (1993) found evidence for an 
assimilation effect in prior performance ratings. 
Smither, Reilly, & Buda (1988) expanded their method to include the means of 
procuring prior information about the performer as a variable of interest. They found 
evidence for a contrast effect when knowledge of prior performance was directly 
observed, but an assimilation effect when prior performance was communicated via 
pervious performance ratings. However, when there was more of a delay between 
viewing of initial (good or bad) performance and later (average) performance, there were 
no effects. Similarly, Huber, Neale, and Northcraft (1987) found no difference in the 
ratings made by managers in either the presence or absence of prior performance relative 
to performance standards (e.g., “in the past, this person performed above average”).  
Maurer, Palmer, and Lisnov (1995) examined the effects of another individual’s 
performance on the rating of performance (e.g., the effect of a peer’s performance level 
on an evaluation of another). They demonstrated that the context in which performance 
appraisals are made can influence rating behavior; when average performance of one 
person was preceded by good performance of another, raters were more severe. Similarly, 
when poor performance of an individual was followed by average performance of 
another, raters were much more lenient. 
Thorsteinson, Breier, Atwell, Hamilton, and Privette (2008) have demonstrated 
that assimilation effects can occur with information that is not at all relevant to the 
current measurement of performance. They showed three separate samples of participants 
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only one example of a filled-out performance rating instrument that was either rated at a 
high level (i.e., all ratings were 9 out of 9) or at a low level (i.e., all ratings were 1 out of 
9) of performance before asking them to complete a performance appraisal for a 
lecturer’s performance. Raters that were anchored by high levels of performance (made 
after seeing the example with high performance ratings) gave higher ratings than control 
group raters (who saw no example) and low-anchored raters (who saw the example with 
low performance ratings).  
Other researchers have examined the effects of behavioral expectations of the 
rater on the level of rating. For example, Mount and Thompson (1987) found that ratings 
are more accurate when the behaviors of the ratee are congruent with the behavioral 
expectations of the rater, however, they also found greater leniency and halo under these 
conditions. Hogan (1987) found a significant direct effect of supervisory expectations on 
predicting performance six months later—those that were expected to do well were rated 
highly. In addition, she found an interaction effect between actual and predicted 
performance on performance ratings such that those with low expected performance but 
actual high performance were rated lower than those that were predicted to have high 
performance. Similarly, those that were expected to have high performance, but had low 
actual performance were actually rated lower than those who were met expectations of 
low performance. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that managers tend to provide ratings 
that are in-line with their expectations.  
Self-Appraisal Information.  Some organizations choose to have their 
employees provide self-ratings of performance in addition to their manager’s ratings. 
Research has shown that if self-appraisal information is made available to a rater, it can 
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affect their ratings. Early results from Klimoski and Inks (1990) suggested that raters 
tended to gravitate toward the self-rating of performance as given by the performer. 
Shore and Tashchain (2002) examined the effects of the presence of self-appraisal 
information, normative information, and actual performance on ratings. They found a 
main effect for both task performance and self-assessment: higher task performance was 
associated with higher ratings, as were higher self-assessments. They also found 
interaction effects of task performance and self appraisal. Regardless of self-appraisal 
level, high task performance was rated equally. However, when a poor performer 
provided a high self-rating, the rater provided a higher rating of performance than if the 
performer provided a low (i.e., more accurate) self-rating. Randall and Sharples (2012) 
replicated these results—raters gave higher ratings to poor performers when the 
performers gave themselves inaccurately high self-ratings than when they gave 
themselves moderately inaccurate and accurate self-ratings of performance. 
Normative Information.  Some performance measurement instruments 
encourage the rater to consider a comparison group (e.g., “consider the average 
employee”) or sometimes provide an explicit standard of performance (e.g., “an average 
performer behaves in this way”). Shore and Tashchain (2002) found an interaction effect 
of the presence of normative information and the level of self-rating on the rater’s given 
performance rating: when a norm (i.e., standard) of performance was included, ratings 
were equal regardless of self-appraisal level. However, when no norm was provided, 
individuals that gave themselves higher self-appraisals scored higher than individuals that 
gave themselves low self-appraisals. In contrast, in the meta-analysis by Heidemeier and 
Moser (2009) no difference in self-other agreement was found when raters were told to 
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consider a comparison group or were given a standard (ρ = 0.36) and when raters were 
not given a standard (ρ = 0.32).  
Politics. Longenecker, Sims, and Gioia (1987) brought the issue of the role of 
politics in performance appraisal to light. They interviewed a number of executives 
across a number of organizations, and came to four conclusions: (1) that politics is a 
reality of organizational life (and performance appraisal is no exception); (2) that many 
things influence the political culture of an organization (e.g., its economic health, 
executive beliefs about performance management); (3) that performance rating inflation 
happens for many reasons, some of which are political (e.g., to promote “up and out” a 
person with bad fit to avoid confrontation); and (4) that performance rating deflation 
happens for many reasons, some of which are political (e.g., to send a message to the 
subordinate to leave, to “teach a subordinate a lesson”). Gioia and Longenecker (1994) 
interviewed more executives and derived five similar themes: (1) that the higher one rises 
in the organization, the more political the performance appraisal process becomes, (2) 
appraisals of managers are particularly susceptible to politicking, (3) raters are affected 
by things other than performance when making the rating (e.g., maintaining a reputation, 
the political climate of the organization), (4) senior executives have too much freedom in 
their evaluations, and (5) appraisal is a political tool to control people and resources. 
In order to encourage quantitative research in this area, Tziner, Latham, Price, and 
Haccoun (1996) developed a questionnaire (the Questionnaire of Political Considerations 
in Performance Appraisal, QPCPA; later renamed the PCPAQ; Tziner, Prince, & 
Murphy, 1997) for measuring the influence of political considerations in performance 
appraisal. This instrument was developed specifically to be completed by raters of 
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performance in order to understand the political climate under which raters operate, and 
demonstrated decent test-retest reliability and both convergent (with Machiavellianism 
and Need for Power) and divergent (with organizational commitment) validities. Tziner 
(1999) then used the measure to understand what leads to use of political considerations 
in performance evaluations: he found that self-efficacy as a rater and continuance 
commitment were both negatively related to reliance on politics in a police officer 
sample.  
Bernardin and Beatty (1984) did not study politics per se, but did examine the 
effects of rater perceived norms regarding the rating process on rating level. They 
developed the “Trust in the Appraisal Process Survey” (TAPS) which assessed the degree 
to which a rater thinks that a “typical supervisor” intentionally manipulates their 
performance ratings of their subordinates. In a quasi-experiment in two police 
departments, they found that, over time (i.e., six months after the PA system was in 
place), there was less trust in the accuracy of the appraisals as well as a general increase 
in the level of the performance ratings, and that these problems were exacerbated in the 
department where appraisals were used for administrative purposes compared to the 
department where the ratings were used only for feedback purposes. A similar study was 
recently conducted by Spence and Keeping (2010). They found that when raters 
suggested that the organizational norms (as perceived by the raters) were to provide high 
ratings, the ratings were indeed higher than when organizational norms were to provide 
accurate ratings. Also, when giving high ratings was in the rater’s best interest (i.e., when 
their subordinates’ ratings were a component of their performance rating), ratings were 
higher. Unfortunately, few other researchers have investigated the effects of politics from 
37 
this perspective—most have examined the effects of the ratee’s perceptions of 
organizational politics (POP; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989). 
While the ratee’s perspective on organizational politics (i.e., the factors they 
perceive are affected by politics in the organization) has long been demonstrated to 
predict important outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction, turnover, and organizational 
commitment; see Miller, Rutherford, & Kolodinsky, 2008 for a recent meta-analysis), it 
is only relatively recently that researchers have investigated a link between POP and 
performance ratings. Researchers have repeatedly found a direct negative correlation 
between a ratee’s perception of organizational politics and job performance as rated by 
their supervisor—individuals in a more political environment tend to have lower 
performance (Chen & Fang, 2008; Witt, 1998; Vigoda, 2000; Zivnuska et al., 2004). 
They tend to suggest that the effect is due to a highly political climate causing decreased 
performance, usually through posited low expectations of ratings being influenced by 
actual performance. However, this research is entirely cross-sectional, within one 
organization, at one point in time—it is also possible that low performers tend to “explain 
away” their low performance by indicating that their environment is dictated by politics 
and not by merit. Therefore, while it seems logical that politics play a part in performance 
ratings, their exact mechanisms are not well understood. 
Accountability.  Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, and Doherty (1994) 
outlined the necessary conditions for an individual to feel responsible for an action: (1) 
the action should have a set of governing instructions or rules of conduct, (2) the person 
is bound to behave within the confines of those rules, and (3) the person has control over 
the action. Accountability, then, “involves an evaluative reckoning [of these three 
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elements] in which the individuals are judged” (p. 634)—it requires an audience. Over 
the years, researchers have hypothesized the effects of accountability in both directions—
Bernardin, Thomason, Buckly, and Kane (2016) hypothesized that high accountability 
would result in a higher influence of personality on rating inflation, whereas Harahi, 
Rudolph, and Laginess (2015) suggested that high accountability would lead to less 
personality-influenced rating inflation. Empirical results have also been in either 
direction. For example, Klimoski and Inks (1990) found that ratings were less accurate 
when participants were required to justify their responses, whereas Mero and Motowidlo 
(1995) found the opposite. Similarly, Bernardin et al. (2016) found evidence for a 
stronger effect of personality under highly accountable conditions in their study, whereas 
Harahi et al. (2015) found the opposite in their meta-analysis. 
Results from Curtis, Harvey, and Ravden (2005) can elucidate the problem. They 
noted the difference between upward and downward accountability: upward 
accountability is when the rater is held responsible by someone of higher standing than 
themselves (e.g., the researcher, or their supervisor) whereas downward accountability is 
when the rater is held responsible by a party of lower standing than themselves (e.g., their 
subordinate). Klimoski and Inks (1990) and Bernardin et al. (2016) held their participants 
accountable to their ratees, whereas Mero and Motowidlo (1995) held them accountable 
to the researchers. Harahi et al. (2015) did not provide a clear description of their 
accountability definition, but it is possible that they used the various authors’ definitions 
that went into their meta-analysis, as the variance around their estimate is very high. In 
experiments that explicitly defined (and manipulated) accountability along the upward-
downward dimension found that upward accountability resulted in more accurate ratings, 
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while downward accountability resulted in more lenient ratings (Curtis, Harvey, & 
Ravden, 2005; Mero, Guidice, & Brownlee, 2007). One incongruent result does exist, 
however: Spence and Keeping (2010) found that lower ratings were given when the 
manager was expecting to be confronted by the ratee. They posited that the expectation of 
a confrontation by the employee (in a vignette) may have led to disliking of the 
employee
6
. 
Ratee Concerns 
Certain characteristics of the ratee might influence the rating that they receive 
from their supervisor.  Some are relatively stable individual differences; others are 
characteristics of the job itself. Ideally, the only influential characteristic in a 
performance rating would be the ratee’s actual level of job performance, but there is 
some research to suggest that that is not the case. Evidence will be reviewed regarding 
the influence of individual differences (e.g., demographics, personality), the ratee’s job 
type, and ratee ability. 
Individual Differences.  There are certain stable characteristics of the ratee that 
may influence the ratings that are given to them by their rater. Some of the most 
researched variables are demographic variables (e.g., race, gender, and age). This is most 
likely due, in part, to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—specifically Title VII—
which prohibits discrimination in employment decisions like hiring and “status as an 
employee” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Age was later 
protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Other individual 
difference variables (e.g., personality) have also been studied. 
                                                 
6
 “liking” effects to be discussed below 
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Demographics.  Early work on the effects of demographics on received ratings 
was mostly conducted in the laboratory on undergraduate student participants that read 
vignettes or watched recorded videos of performance. Some found a significant effect of 
sex on the performance ratings they received: Hamner, Kim, Baird, and Bigoness (1974) 
found that female ratees were rated more highly than were males, particularly at high 
levels of performance (Bigoness, 1976 replicated these results); Rosen and Jerdee (1974) 
found that females were rated much lower than were males; Hall and Hall (1976) found 
no effect of the gender of the ratee on performance ratings. Similarly, Hall and Hall 
(1976) found no effect of race on the performance ratings received, but Bigoness (1976) 
found that low-performing blacks were rated higher than low performing whites. 
Similarly, Rosen and Jerdee (1976a, 1976b) found that older employees were judged as 
less cognitively, physically, and emotionally fit to perform.  
Eventually researchers moved out of the laboratory and began to use field 
samples. Ferris, Yates, Gilmore, and Rowland (1985) found that older nurses were rated 
much lower than their younger counterparts. In a sample of sales representatives, Liden, 
Stilwell, and Ferris (1996) found that older employees were rated more highly than 
younger employees. Both Waldman and Avolio (1991) and Landau (1995) found that, 
after controlling for certain demographic variables (e.g., age, education, tenure), female 
employees were rated lower on promotion potential than were men; similarly, black and 
Asian employees were rated lower than were white employees. Greenhaus, Parasuraman, 
and Wormley (1990) found that black employees were rated lower on both job 
performance and promotability. In contrast, Pulakos, Schmitt, and Chan (1996) found no 
significant difference in their measurement model fit between different races or genders, 
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and Bass and Turner (1973) found no significant difference between ratings of bank 
tellers of different races. This mixture of findings led some researchers to search for the 
answer with two approaches: large sample studies and meta-analyses. 
Pulakos, White, Oppler, and Borman (1989) found significant main effects of 
ratee race on performance rating received in a large military sample: for technical skill 
and job effort, Hispanics were rated the highest, followed by whites, followed by black 
personnel; for personal discipline, Hispanics and whites were rated the highest, followed 
by blacks; for military bearing ratings, blacks and Hispanics were rated more highly than 
white employees. McKay and McDaniel (2006) later conducted a meta-analysis on black-
white differences in performance ratings and found evidence of higher ratings for whites 
(d = 0.27), and the difference was larger for overall ratings of job performance (d = 0.35) 
than for other measures (e.g., task performance, d = 0.21). In their meta-analysis, Bowen, 
Swim, and Jacobs (2000) found little evidence for gender bias in performance ratings in 
operational settings (d = -0.01). Roth, Purvis, and Bobko (2012) updated this analysis and 
included promotability ratings—females were generally rated higher on job performance 
(d = 0.11), but men were rated higher on promotability ratings (d = 0.10). 
Job Tenure.  It seems logical that the longer an individual is on a job, the better 
they would perform that job, and therefore the ratings that a more experienced worker 
gets may be larger than those of a less experienced worker. Early results from Zedeck and 
Baker (1972) confirmed this suspicion: they found a significant correlation between 
tenure as a nurse and performance ratings (r = 0.23). However, many more results have 
suggested that there is no effect of job tenure of the ratee on the performance rating that 
they are given: Bass and Turner (1973) found positive relationships between time on the 
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job for bank tellers and supervisory ratings of certain dimensions of performance (e.g., 
cooperation, r = 0.25) but not for the overall performance rating (r = -0.06, n.s.). Cascio 
and Valenzi, (1977) found no effect of ratee experience on BARS scales of police officer 
performance. Huber, Neale, and Northcraft (1987) found no significant correlation 
between ratee job experience and performance rating for a mixed group of ratee jobs 
(e.g., administrative, technical, and professional positions). More recently, Greguras 
(2005) demonstrated measurement equivalence of a performance rating scale across 
different levels of ratee managerial experience, and also found that the mean level of 
ratings (of adaptability and coaching skills) was similar across all managerial experience 
levels. 
Personality.  The personality of the ratee has garnered some attention in 
predicting supervisory ratings of performance, particularly in the ratings of expatriate 
employees. Expatriate performance was hypothesized to be influenced by personality 
factors like open-mindedness, extraversion, and emotional stability due to the nature of 
expatriate life (Arthur & Bennett, 1995; Mendenhall & Oddou, 1985; Hammer, 
Grudykunst, & Wiseman, 1978). However, in an explicit test of the Big Five personality 
factors on expatriate supervisory performance ratings, Caligiuri (2000) found that only 
ratee conscientiousness was positively related to supervisory performance ratings in an 
expatriate assignment.  
Others have examined the effects of personality on ratings of job performance for 
non-expatriate assignments. In a military sample, Borman, White, and Dorsey (1995) 
found that factors like dependability and friendliness were not associated with 
performance ratings. Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein (1991) conducted a meta-analysis on 
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the use of personality as a predictor of job performance (specifically to speak for its use 
as a predictor in selection) and found that there was generally a modest correlation 
between the Big Five personality factors and job performance ratings—the effects were 
smaller in incumbent samples than they were in recruited samples, but were also larger in 
studies of subjective criteria (i.e., ratings) than they were in studies with objective job 
performance criteria. Barrick and Mount (1991) found similar results in their meta-
analysis. Judge, LePine, and Rich (2006) found no relationship between the Big Five 
personality factors and peer ratings of leadership or supervisory ratings of either 
contextual or task performance. They did find a significant negative effect of ratee 
narcissism on peer ratings of performance, but no direct effects on either type of 
supervisory rating. Bell and Arthur (2008) found that assessor ratings in an assessment 
center were not related to the ratee’s extraversion (r = 0.15, n.s.), emotional stability (r = 
0.12, n.s.), or agreeableness (r = 0.01). 
Job Type.  The nature of the ratee’s job also has some influence over the 
measurement of performance in that job. Several meta-analyses have borne out this 
relationship. The meta-analysis of Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) showed that across-
source correlations were generally higher for blue-collar or service jobs than they were 
for managerial or professional jobs, particularly for self-supervisor correlations (ρ = 0.27 
in managerial/professional, ρ = 0.42 in blue-collar/service jobs). Similarly, Conway and 
Huffcutt (1997) found higher interrater reliabilities for supervisory ratings of 
performance and peer ratings of performance when jobs were lower in complexity (e.g., ρ 
= 0.60 in low complexity jobs versus ρ = 0.48 in high complexity jobs) and in non-
managerial jobs (ρ = 0.54 versus ρ = 0.44 in managerial jobs). Heidemeier and Moser 
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(2007) found similar results in correlational agreement between the self and supervisor: 
blue-collar jobs had higher agreement (r = 0.33) than did white-collar jobs (r = 0.21); less 
complex jobs had much higher agreement (r = 0.47) than did complex jobs (r = 0.29).  
Ability.  The link between cognitive ability (CA, a.k.a. general mental ability, 
GMA) and supervisory ratings of job performance has been established empirically 
numerous times. Hunter (1983) conducted a path analysis which demonstrated that GMA 
is positively associated with job knowledge, which is in turn positively associated with 
supervisory ratings of performance. Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986) replicated 
these results in both a civilian and a military sample. Coward and Sackett (1990) 
provided empirical evidence that the relationship between cognitive ability and job 
performance (“typically supervisor ratings”, p. 298) was linear and positive. Hunter and 
Schmidt (1996) and Schmidt and Hunter (2004) provided even more evidence to suggest 
that ability and job performance are positively related. Other groups of researchers (e.g., 
Kolz, McFarland, & Silverman, 1998; Morgeson, Delaney, & Hemingway, 2005) have 
also confirmed the relationship. It is perhaps one of the least controversial statements in 
I-O Psychology that ability predicts job performance (which is most frequently 
operationalized as supervisory ratings). 
Rater Concerns 
There are many qualities of the raters themselves which can heavily influence the 
quality of the performance rating that they give. Cronbach (1955) developed a method of 
assessing rating accuracy that mathematically separated the accuracy space into four 
measures: elevation, differential elevation, stereotype accuracy, and differential accuracy. 
Elevation is the extent to which a rater under- or over-rates a ratee compared to some 
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expert’s rating. Differential elevation is the extent to which the rater can distinguish how 
far the ratee deviates from the average ratee’s performance. Stereotype accuracy 
describes the rater’s ability to determine what the average performance is. Differential 
accuracy is the rater’s ability to rate the differences between ratees on a given item. 
Although this method is no longer used with much frequency, it exemplifies the need for 
accurate ratings in research. An understanding of what affects a rater’s accuracy is 
essential to building knowledge in the feedback research space. 
Individual Differences.  Research has demonstrated that rating elevation (i.e., 
leniency) is a relatively stable characteristic (Borman & Hallam, 1991; Kane, Bernardin, 
Villanova, & Peyrefitte, 1995; Villanova, Bernardin, Dahmus, & Sims, 1993). As such, a 
number of relatively stable individual differences have been investigated in an attempt to 
understand the potential mechanisms of rating elevation’s stability.  
Personality.  Bernardin and colleagues (Bernardin, Cooke, Villanova, 2000; 
Bernardin, Tyler, & Villanova, 2009; Kane et al., 1995; Villanova et al., 1993; Villanova, 
Bernardin, & Ross, 1997) have studied the effects of rater personality on rating effects for 
several years using student samples. Villanova, Bernardin, and Ross (1997) used the 16 
personality factor model (16PF; Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970) to assess peer-rating 
leniency levels—their results suggested that agreeableness was positively related to rating 
level, but conscientiousness was not. Bernardin, Cooke, and Villanova (2000) repeated 
the study, but used the Big Five Factor model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992). They 
found that (1) agreeableness was positively correlated with rating level, (2) 
conscientiousness was negatively correlated with rating level, and (3) raters that were 
both low on conscientiousness and high on agreeableness had ratings that were more 
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elevated than all other groups combined. Bernardin, Tyler, and Villanova (2009) 
replicated these results and additionally found that agreeableness was negatively 
associated with and conscientiousness was positively related to rating accuracy. Most 
recently, Bernardin, Thomason, Buckley, and Kane (2016) found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between rating accuracy and both agreeableness and assertiveness.  
Yun, Donahue, Dudley, and McFarland (2005) increased the fidelity of their study 
by training their student sample (with frame-of-reference training) on how to rate 
performance on their ratee’s task, and also by including a condition where raters were 
expected to give the feedback to the ratee in a face-to-face meeting. They found that 
agreeableness was positively correlated with rating elevation, particularly in the face-to-
face feedback condition.  Dewberry, Davies-Muir, and Newell (2013) further increased 
fidelity by using trained assessors in medical assessments; unlike most performance 
appraisal situations, however, the raters were not expected to interact with the ratees after 
the appraisal process was complete. They found no effect of personality on rater leniency 
or severity. 
Ogunfowora, Bourdage, and Lee (2010) used a policy capturing design to 
understand how rater personality affects the relative weights that raters put on aspects of 
performance when making a singular rating. They found that raters high on Openness to 
Experience placed greater weight on adaptive performance, while raters high on Modesty 
(they used the HEXACO model of personality; Ashton & Lee, 2007) weighted deviant 
behaviors more heavily than those low on the dimension. Bono, Hooper, and Yoon 
(2012) conducted two studies on this topic: one field observational study of leaders and 
one experimental study of students. In their first study, they found a positive relationship 
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between four of the five personality factors (agreeableness, openness, extraversion, and 
conscientiousness) and rating level, but no relationship between neuroticism and rating 
level. In their experiment, they found no effect for any of the personality traits. 
Harari, Rudolph, and Laginess (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on 28 studies of 
the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and performance ratings. Results 
from bivariate analyses suggest that agreeableness, extraversion, and emotional stability 
were all positively related to the level of performance rating (ρ = 0.25, ρ = 0.12, and ρ = 
0.14, respectively). Results for conscientiousness were highly variable (80% CV [-0.12, 
0.32]). Multivariate regression analyses predicting performance rating behavior found 
significant results for agreeableness (β = 0.22), extraversion (β = 0.08), emotional 
stability (β = 0.08), and openness (β = -0.06). 
Demographics.  Some early research in the performance appraisal literature 
focused on the effect of gender of the rater on ratings. Many researchers found no effect 
of rater gender on performance ratings (Huber, Neale, & Northcraft, 1987; Mai-Dalton, 
Feldman-Summers, & Mitchell, 1979; Mobley, 1980; Nieva & Guteck, 1981; Rosen & 
Jerdee, 1976b), but typically used small student samples. Although they too used a 
student sample, Hamner, Kim, Baird, and Bigoness (1974) found that females gave 
higher ratings than men did. These findings were later replicated by Mobley (1982), 
Wexley and Pulakos (1982), and Pulakos, White, Oppler, and Borman (1989) also in a 
supply organization sample, a mixed organization sample, and an Army personnel 
sample, respectively. However, Northcraft, Huber, and Neale (1988) found the opposite 
to be true: in their sample female supervisors gave lower ratings than male supervisors. 
Others (Shore & Thornton, 1986) found no effect of gender on performance ratings. 
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There are large sample-sized and methodologically sound studies on both sides of the 
effect; researchers later turned to studying relational demography (discussed in the 
section Rater-Ratee Relationship. below) before settling this debate. 
The research on the effects of rater age is more scant than for rater gender but is 
more conclusive. Early results from Klores (1996) suggest that age has no effect: 
immediately preceding its inclusion in a list of independent variables it was not 
“discussed further because, except for the expected obvious correlation between age and 
years with the company, there were no indications of any significant or even consistent 
relationships between age and experience variables and performance ratings” (414). 
Later, Rosen and Jerdee (1976a) observed that for one of four performance dimensions, 
older raters perceived a smaller difference between young and old ratees than did 
younger raters. Similarly, Schwab and Heneman (1978) found that there was a significant 
effect of rater age for only one out of six types of performance ratings such that older 
raters gave higher ratings than younger raters did. Later, in a sample of managers, 
Cleveland and Landy (1981) found that younger supervisors in a manufacturing 
organization rated their subordinates more highly on one performance dimension 
(Interpersonal Skills), and rater age had no effect on the other five dimensions. 
Finkelstein and Burke (1998) failed to find any connection between rater age and 
performance ratings, but did find an effect for ratings of economic worth. The lack of 
consistency in the findings, and the fact that often there is an effect for only one of many 
dimensions, suggests that there is likely no effect of rater age on performance ratings.   
The effect of the race of the rater also garnered some attention around the same 
time as rater gender, but was usually included as a supplementary analysis to a gender 
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inquiry. Hamner, Kim, Baird, and Bigoness (1974) found that black raters tended to give 
higher ratings than did white raters. However, their sample was rather small and was 
conducted in a laboratory setting (i.e., they were non-consequential ratings). Schmitt and 
Lappin (1980) examined both the level of the performance rating and the accuracy of the 
rating. They found no effect for the race of the rater in terms of the average level of the 
performance rating between black and white raters, but did find that there was a higher 
correlation between rated performance and actual performance in the white rater group 
than in the black rater group. Both studies were based on relatively small student samples 
that rated pre-recorded task performance by actors. In contrast, Mobley (1982) examined 
actual performance ratings from supervisors in a supply organization and found no effect 
of rater race on the ratings that they gave. 
Experience.  Although job (or organizational) tenure is typically highly correlated 
with age, it has been examined a number of times as a separate predictor of rating 
behavior. Early results from Klores (1966) suggest that there was no significant effect of 
rater tenure with the company or tenure with the ratee group on the ratings given. Cascio 
and Valenzi (1977) had highly experienced (six or more years in-grade) and less 
experienced (less than six years in-grade) metropolitan police sergeants rate their 
subordinate officers on their performance. They found that more experienced sergeants 
gave higher performance ratings than did their less-experienced counterparts. Huber, 
Neale, and Northcraft (1987) found no effect of job tenure on performance ratings. 
Similarly, Govaerts, van de Wiel, and van der Vleuten (2013) found no effect of rater 
experience on the quality of feedback that was given. 
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Other researchers have examined the effect of amount of experience with 
performance appraisals on rating behavior. Spence and Keeping (2010) found that 
individuals that had more experience with performance appraisal, in general, gave lower 
ratings than those with less experience. Villanova, Bernardin, Dahmus, and Sims (1993) 
developed the Performance Appraisal Discomfort Scale (PADS) and demonstrated that 
rating leniency was highly correlated to responses on the scale—those that were less 
comfortable giving performance ratings were more likely to be lenient. However, Tziner, 
Murphy, Cleveland, Yavo, and Hayoon (2008) found no significant relationship between 
scores on the PADS and absolute rating level or ability to discriminate between ratees. 
Bernardin, Thomason, Buckley, and Kane (2016) designed the “Employee Discussion” 
exercise—in which a manager roleplays an interview with a store associate and is 
observed by two assessors—to evaluate Performance Management Competence (PMC). 
They found that PMC was negatively related to mean rating level given by the manager 
and was positively associated with rating accuracy. 
Ability.  Rater cognitive abilities have been studied extensively as a correlate of 
rater accuracy. Early research results suggested that there was a positive linear 
relationship between rater intelligence and rating accuracy (Borman, 1979). Smither and 
Reilly (1987) found that rater intelligence was significantly positively correlated with 
stereotype accuracy (i.e., rater ability to determine the average). They also found a 
curvilinear relationship between rater intelligence and differential accuracy (i.e., rater 
ability to determine ratee’s deviation from average on an item) and stereotype accuracy 
such that those that were particularly high and particularly low on intelligence were less 
accurate than those that were moderately intelligent. Later researchers were able to 
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replicate the general finding of a linear relationship between rater intelligence and 
accuracy, but not the curvilinear relationship (Borman & Hallam, 1991; Hauenstein & 
Alexander, 1991). 
The aforementioned studies had many characteristics in common: they were all 
conducted in laboratory settings with vignettes or videos of relatively objective task 
performance (e.g., jet engine installation) and intelligence was measured with the 
Wesman Personnel Classification Test (WPCT; Wesman, 1965). In contrast, Bartels and 
Doverspike (1997) found that intelligence of an assessment center rater (as measured by 
the 16PF; Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970) was positively related to rating leniency. 
Dewberry, Davies-Muir, and Newell (2013) found no correlation between fluid 
intelligence (as measured by a version of Raven’s Progressive Matrices) and rating 
leniency or severity of clinical examination assessors. 
Commitment. Tziner, Murphy, Cleveland, Beaudin, and Marchand (1998) 
hypothesized that organizational commitment level of the rater would increase the 
probability that raters would invest more effort into the performance appraisal process 
and therefore be positively related to discrimination among ratees and performance 
dimensions, and be related to a willingness to assign low scores. They examined this 
relationship in a relatively small student sample (N = 121) and found that organizational 
commitment was not significantly related to rating level nor related to discrimination 
among ratees. They were encouraged by the relatively high magnitude of the correlations, 
however, and obtained a second sample in which to test the relationship again. Tziner and 
Murphy (1999) found a significant positive relationship between commitment and ability 
to discriminate between ratees, but not between commitment and rating level or 
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discrimination among dimensions. However, in a set of seven samples using structural 
equation modeling, Tziner et al. (2001) found that the combined effect of organizational 
commitment and climate perceptions were positively related to rating level and 
discrimination among dimensions, but was negatively related to discrimination among 
ratees.  
Training.  The potential need for rater training was recognized very early in the 
history of I-O psychology (Bitner, 1948). Early reviewers of the literature suggested that 
rater training is effective at reducing rater bias and at increasing rating accuracy (Smith, 
1986; Spool, 1978). Woehr and Huffcutt (1994) expanded their review to assess the 
effectiveness of rater training across the types of training and dependent variables. They 
defined four basic approaches to rater training: (1) rater error training, which familiarizes 
raters with the basic types of psychometric errors (e.g., leniency, halo, central tendency) 
and encourages them to avoid committing such errors; (2) performance dimension 
training, which acquaints raters with the various dimensions of performance on which 
employees should be rated so as to avoid making global, heuristic-based ratings; (3) 
frame-of-reference training, which is typically performance dimension training but also 
includes behavioral examples of each level of performance in each dimension so that 
raters are using a common conceptualization of performance when making their ratings; 
and (4) behavioral observation training, which combats lack of observation on the part of 
the rater—raters are trained on their ability to recall behavioral events and are assessed 
for their recall accuracy. The dependent variables assessed in the meta-analysis were: (1) 
halo error, (2) leniency error, (3) rating accuracy (e.g., the distance between the trainee’s 
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an expert’s rating), and (4) observational accuracy (e.g., the ability to correctly recall the 
number of times a behavior occurred).  
Their results indicate that rater error training is the most popular form of training: 
it was effective at reducing both halo and leniency errors (d = 0.33 and d = 0.21, 
respectively) and increased rater accuracy (d = 0.26). Interestingly, they found that rater 
error training which trains raters to recognize rating patterns as potentially erroneous (i.e., 
with a focus on correcting their distribution of ratings) actually decreased rating accuracy 
(d = -0.20) while traditional rater error training without the emphasis of rating 
distributions substantially increased rating accuracy (d = 0.76). Performance dimension 
training had a positive effect on decreasing halo error (d = 0.30), but a slight increase on 
leniency (d = -0.14) and a small increase in rating accuracy (d = 0.13). Frame-of-
reference training was the most effective at increasing rating accuracy (d = 0.83), with 
slight decreases in both halo (d = 0.13) and leniency (d = 0.15) errors. Behavioral 
observation training was effective at increasing rating and observational accuracy (d = 
0.77 and d = 0.49, respectively), but had very few data points available (k = 4, N = 224). 
Motivation.  The importance of understanding the motivation of a rater was 
recognized by Taft (1955):  
But probably the most important area of all is that of motivation: if the judge is 
motivated to make accurate judgements about his subject and if he feels himself 
free to be objective, then he has a good chance of achieving his aim. (p. 21, 
emphasis original).  
However, in the performance appraisal domain, the consideration of the motivational 
aspects of the process was not a topic of interest until considerably later (cf. Landy & 
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Farr, 1980). Bernardin and Beatty (1984) believed that the lack of evidence for the effect 
of rating scale formats on rating accuracy was due largely to the fact that the “largest 
portion of the variance in format comparisons lies with individual raters and their 
motivation (or lack thereof) to rate accurately” (p. 267-268). They did not provide any 
data to support this supposition, however. 
Harris (1994) provided a motivational framework to guide research into the role 
of rater motivation on performance appraisal behaviors—situational factors (e.g., 
accountability, trust) and personal factors (e.g., self-efficacy and mood) he posited would 
influence the motivational factors (rewards, negative consequences, and impression 
management) of performance appraisal, which would, in turn, affect the performance 
appraisal behaviors (observation, storage, retrieval, integration, rating, and feedback). 
Although the model was somewhat simple, it seemed to help spur research interest into 
the area—a decade later, there was enough research to justify a review. 
Spence and Keeping (2011) first noted that there were many names to describe 
similar motivations for performance appraisal behavior; they condensed the somewhat 
separate research areas of politics, impression management, leniency, rater goals, and 
rater motivation down to a few basic motivations. Raters were found to inflate ratings: (1) 
to avoid confrontation with subordinates, (2) to comply with organizational norms, (3) to 
promote a problem employee out of the department, (4) to appear as a competent 
manager, (5) to procure resources, (6) to motivate or act in the best interest of the ratee, 
and (7) because performance appraisal competes with other, more rewarded tasks. Raters 
had also been found to deflate ratings, mostly to build a case to justify firing of an 
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employee or to “send a message” to poor performers. Soon after, Spence and Keeping 
refined their theory. 
Spence and Keeping (2013) built out their findings to fit within the context of the 
theory of planned behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991). They suggested that there were four rater 
intentions that could influence their subsequent ratings: to avoid conflict, to be 
benevolent, to be accurate, and to impression manage. The relative weighting of these 
intentions is determined by the rater’s attitudes toward the intention, their perceived 
norms for the intention, and the perceived behavioral control over the intention. The 
attitudes, norms, and control of the rater are influenced by so-called “tributary variables” 
such as manager characteristics, subordinate characteristics, situational factors, and 
subordinate job performance. An outline of their model is shown in Figure 3.  
Other Characteristics.  A number of other rater characteristics have been studied 
with somewhat less frequency. For example, the mood that the rater is in has been shown 
to affect the ratings that they give—generally, raters in positive moods tend to give 
higher ratings than raters in negative moods (Fried, Levi, Ben-David, Tiegs, & Avital, 
2000; Poon, 2001). Further, Robbins and DeNisi (1998) found that raters in a negative 
mood recalled more performance incidents, and that raters in general were more likely to 
recall events that were incongruent with their current mood (e.g., a rater in a negative 
mood was more likely to recall positive performance behaviors from their subordinate). 
Other researchers have examined the effect of rater philosophical perspectives on 
the ratings that they give. Wexley and Youtz (1985) measured rater beliefs about human 
nature (e.g., human trustworthiness, independence, rationality, altruism, and variability), 
and found that raters that believe that people are basically good and that people are more 
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or less the same are the most lenient, while those who believe that people greatly differ 
from one another rated the most accurately. Heslin and colleagues (Heslin, Latham, & 
VandeWalle, 2005; Heslin & VandeWalle, 2008) have also studied the effects of rater 
perceived malleability of personal attributes (i.e., the extent to which a rater believes that 
a person’s personality and abilities are changeable) on rating behavior. They found that 
raters who perceive that personal attributes are less malleable are less likely to recognize 
actual changes in employee performance and are less likely to coach employees on how 
to improve their performance. 
Rater-Ratee Relationship.  To this point, simple main effects of rater and ratee 
characteristics on the ratings that are given or received have been discussed. However, 
interaction effects between rater and ratee characteristics, and also characteristics of the 
relationship itself have also been investigated. The most popular of these will be 
discussed below:  rater liking of the ratee, rater-ratee similarity, and the duration of the 
rater-ratee relationship. 
Liking. A great deal of research has been conducted on the effects of 
interpersonal affect or “liking” of the ratee—that is, the extent to which the rater’s liking 
of the ratee can influence their ratings. Many researchers have found evidence for a 
positive relationship between rater interpersonal affect and rating level (e.g., Cardy & 
Dobbins, 1986; Turban, Jones, & Rozelle, 1990; Conway, 1988; Judge & Ferris, 1993; 
Tsui & Barry, 1986), while some found no effect (e.g., Borman, White, & Dorsey, 1995). 
Others searched for moderators—for example, in-person performance versus electronic 
performance (Weisband & Atwater, 1999), feedback source (Antonioni & Park, 2001); 
rating content (Varma, DeNisi, & Peters, 1996), and country culture (Carmona, Iyer, & 
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Reckers, 2014). Some investigated explanatory variables like likelihood to punish poor 
performance (Dobbins & Russell, 1986) or recollection of positive and negative 
performance (Robbins & DeNisi, 1998).  
In order to better understand the relationship between interpersonal affect and 
performance ratings, Sutton, Baldwin, Wood, and Hoffman (2013) conducted a meta-
analysis—they found a substantial positive relationship between liking and performance 
ratings (ρ = 0.77). They also found significant moderator effects for the performance 
construct that was measured, the source of the ratings, the purpose of the ratings, the job 
complexity of the ratee, and whether the ratee’s job was in sales or not. Measures of OCB 
were considerably less correlated with liking (ρ = 0.51) than were measures of task 
performance (ρ = 0.75) or of overall performance (ρ = 0.77). Peer ratings were the least 
correlated with liking (ρ = 0.63), followed by supervisory ratings (ρ = 0.72), and 
subordinate ratings were the most correlated (ρ = 0.72). Ratings that were used for 
developmental purposes only were least correlated with liking (ρ = 0.60), followed by 
those for research purposes (ρ = 0.70), then by ratings for administrative purposes (ρ 
=0.71). Ratings made for ratees in less complex jobs were less correlated with liking (ρ = 
0.59) than they were for ratees in more complex jobs (ρ = 0.66). Interestingly, ratings 
were more associated with liking in ratings of sales jobs (ρ = 0.65) than they were for 
non-sales jobs (ρ = 0.54). It also seems that in spite of these significant moderator 
analyses, there is a considerable association between liking and performance ratings. 
However, there is limited research into whether this association between rater 
interpersonal affect and performance ratings is a source of bias or if it reflects an 
association between liking and actual performance (i.e., raters tend to like good 
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performers more than they like poor performers). Lefkowitz (2000) noted this issue in his 
qualitative review, and Sutton et al. (2013) also acknowledged it in their discussion. They 
both suggest that the existing research tends to find that actual performance and liking are 
highly related, but that most of it is conducted within laboratory or controlled settings and 
used a variety of methodologies that make strong conclusions difficult (Adams, 2005; 
Allen & Rush, 1998; Robbins & DeNisi, 1994; Varma, Pichler, & Srinivas, 2005; Varma 
& Pichler, 2007; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). 
Similarity.  Tsui and O’Reilly (1989) coined the term “relational demography” to 
refer to the relative similarity between the demographic categories (e.g., race, age, 
education, tenure) to which a supervisor and subordinate belong. They examined the 
effects of relational demography in the aforementioned variables on job performance 
ratings and rater interpersonal affect—after controlling for subordinate and supervisory 
demographics alone, whether the dyad being of the same gender and of similar job tenure 
significantly predicted performance ratings. For affect, relational demography was 
significantly predictive in gender, education, and job tenure. Ratees in mixed-gender and 
mixed-job tenure dyads were rated lower and less liked than ratees in matched dyads. 
Similarly, those from mixed educational backgrounds were less liked by their supervisor 
than those in matched educational backgrounds.  Some later results suggest that there is 
no effect of relational demography of age on supervisory performance ratings (Vecchio, 
1993; Zalesny & Kirsch, 1989), other results suggest that there may be an effect, through 
increased liking (Judge & Ferris, 1993). Educational similarity has been shown to 
increase job performance ratings (Zalesny & Kirsch, 1989), but also has received null 
evidence (Cascio & Valenzi, 1977). Interestingly, Strauss, Barrick, and Connerley (2001) 
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found that actual relational demography on personality had no effect on performance 
ratings, but perceived personality similarity did. Also, Carmona, Iyer, and Reckers (2014) 
found that perceived similarity to a ratee was more influential in a sample from Spain 
than it was in a sample from the United States. 
The demographic difference in race of rater-ratee dyads is among the more widely 
studied topics in this area. An early meta-analysis by Kraiger and Ford (1985) was 
particularly influential—they found that white raters tended to rate white ratees more 
highly than they did black ratees (d = 0.37) and black raters rated black ratees more 
highly than they did white ratees (d = 0.45) there was, however, considerable variability 
in the effect sizes. In addition, they found a significant moderator effect of race of the 
ratee for white raters in lab settings (d = 0.07) than in field settings (d = 0.39). They did 
not, however, find significant moderator effects of rater training (present or not), rating 
scale (behavioral versus trait), or for rating purpose (administrative versus research).  
However, as Pulakos, White, Oppler, and Borman (1989) note, Kraiger and Ford 
(1985) perfectly confounded race of the rater and of the ratee—that is, ratees were only 
rated by a rater of one race; it could be argued that ratees that happen to work for a black 
rater are lower performers. To address this, they used a large military sample in which 
ratees were rated by two raters—one of each race. They found a significant interaction 
effect of ratee race and rater race, although their effect sizes were considerably smaller 
(e.g., r = 0.08 for white supervisors, where a positive correlation indicates favorability 
toward white ratees, r = 0.02 for black supervisors, same direction) than were Kraiger 
and Ford’s. Thus, there was some evidence to suggest that white ratees tend to be rated 
higher, regardless of the race of the rater.  
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Sackett and DuBois (1991) acquired data that were similar to Pulakos et al. 
(1989), but in a civilian sample. They found a similar result—white raters tended to rate 
white ratees more highly than they rated black ratees (d = 0.36), but black raters also 
rated white ratees more highly than they rated black ratees (d = 0.16) suggesting that 
individuals do not, in fact, rate subordinates more highly if they are from the same race. 
They further discredit the Kraiger and Ford (1985) results by pointing out that many of 
their meta-analyzed studies were from laboratory, undergraduate rater samples, and that 
half of them came from peer ratings of performance, rather than supervisory ratings. 
Some later results from Geddes and Konrad (2003) suggest that same-race dyads are not 
always better: in fact, employees reacted more negatively to negative feedback from 
same-race managers—but they generally reacted more positively to feedback from white 
managers. 
Duration.  Researchers, particularly those in the study of Leader-Member 
Exchange (LMX, Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) have considered the length of the relationship 
as a potential influence on performance ratings. Early results suggested that longer rater-
ratee relationships were associated with higher rating levels (Duarte, Goodson, & Klich, 
1994; Vecchio, 1998). Smith, Harrington, and Houghton (2000) hypothesized that the 
effect may be due, in part, to increased comfort with giving feedback with time; however, 
the length of relationship did not affect performance appraisal discomfort. Similarly, 
Vanneste, Puranam, and Kretschmer (2014) found that the amount of trust in the 
supervisory relationship and its duration is positively, but modestly correlated (ρ = 0.12) 
and highly variable across studies. Rothstein (1990) found a non-linear relationship 
between the months of exposure to the ratee and interrater reliability of their 
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supervisors—for ratings of ability, interrater reliability asymptotes at about 0.60, and 
reaches that level after about a year. 
Interrater Reliability.  Another consideration in the measurement of 
performance is that of interrater reliability. The value of including multiple raters in the 
assessment of job performance was recognized early in the history of I-O psychology 
(Lawler, 1967)—it can provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validities, as 
well as build understanding into how the appraisal process works.  
A brief distinction between interrater reliability and interrater agreement ought to 
be made before proceeding. The extent to which raters agree with one another has been 
operationalized in a number of ways—many of them which actually reflect interrater 
reliability. Interrater reliability is best assessed by correlational measures (e.g., Pearson’s 
r, intraclass correlations)—it provides an indication of the extent to which the rankings 
made by a number of raters are the same (Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992). Interrater 
agreement, on the other hand, is an assessment of the fungibility of raters—the extent to 
which one rater can be replaced with another and the absolute value of the rating does not 
change. Admittedly, the waters here are quite muddy, particularly when it comes to 
operationalization of the two variables in the literature as it currently stands, and the topic 
does not go without its own controversy (see Kozlowski and Hattrup, 1992). 
Within Sources.  Interrater reliability within sources refers to the relative accord 
between raters in similar relative positions to the ratee (e.g., reliability among 
supervisors). Viswesvaran, Ones, and Schmidt (1996) conducted the most thorough meta-
analysis on interrater reliability in performance ratings. They estimated the supervisory 
interrater reliability for overall job performance ratings was moderate (ρ = 0.52) and that 
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ratings of particular performance dimensions were, at times, higher (e.g., Quality ratings, 
ρ = 0.63) while other times lower (e.g., Communication competence, ρ = 0.45) but not 
considerably so. Peer ratings of performance were, in general, estimated to be less 
reliable than those of supervisors (ρ = 0.42), with the exception of ratings of compliance 
(ρ = 0.71, peers; ρ = 0.56, supervisors). Ratings of overall job performance by supervisors 
were also estimated to be highly stable (ρ = 0.81). Conway and Huffcutt (1997) meta-
analyzed multisource performance rating reliabilities and found similar results to 
Viswesvaran et al. (1996). They also expanded to include subordinate ratings—
subordinates were the least reliable (ρ = 0.30), followed by peers (ρ = 0.37), and 
supervisors (ρ = 0.50). Greguras and Robie (1998) also conducted a meta-analysis in this 
space—their estimates were quite similar for supervisory ratings (ρ = 0.51), for peer 
ratings (ρ = 0.37), and for subordinate ratings (ρ = 0.35). 
Between Sources.  Reliability between sources refers to the correlation across 
multiple groups of individuals (e.g., reliability between supervisors and peers). Early 
meta-analytic results from Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) suggest that peer-supervisor 
ratings have the highest correlation (ρ = 0.62), followed by self-peer ratings (ρ = 0.36) 
and self-supervisor ratings (ρ = 0.35). Then, Conway and Huffcutt (1997) found that the 
correlations between the self and other groups were the lowest (ρ = 0.19 with peers, ρ = 
0.22 with supervisors, and ρ = 0.14 with subordinates), the subordinate ratings and other 
groups were next (ρ = 0.22 with peers, ρ = 0.22 with supervisors), and the supervisor-peer 
ratings were the most highly correlated (ρ = 0.34). Most recently, Heidemeier & Moser 
(2009) conducted a meta-analysis of self and supervisory ratings of job performance 
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outside of multisource ratings and found an estimate that was more similar to the results 
of Harris and Schaubroeck (1988; ρ = 0.34). 
Intra-Rater Reliability.  Intra-rater reliability refers to the estimated reliability of 
one rater from a given category (i.e., the rate-rerate reliability of a single rater that has 
been “Spearman-Browned” down to the reliability of one rating). Viswesvaran, Ones, and 
Schmidt (1996) found that intra-rater reliably were considerably higher than interrater 
reliabilities from the same group—supervisory overall job performance ratings and peer 
ratings were very high (ρ = 0.86 and ρ = 0.85, respectively). These estimates are much 
higher than those obtained by Greguras and Robie (1998; e.g., ρ = 0.35 for 1 supervisor) 
but that is likely due to the fact that in contrast to Viswesvaran et al. (1996), they used 
reliabilities from between two separate raters at one point in time, rather than one rater at 
two points in time.  
Self-Other Agreement 
The agreement between self-ratings of performance and other-ratings of 
performance is one area of the interrater agreement research space that has garnered 
much attention, particularly in the 360° feedback on managerial performance literature. 
So-called self-other rating agreement (SOA) has been operationalized in many ways but 
is usually defined as the degree of agreement or congruence between an employee’s self-
ratings and the ratings of others (e.g., in 360° feedback, ratings of the individual given by 
supervisors, peers, subordinates, clients, and customers; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993). 
Incongruence between self and other ratings can be, and has been, interpreted in a 
number of ways: (1) as an indicator of measurement error in performance ratings, (2) as 
an additional source of valid information regarding performance, and, more recently, (3) 
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as a marker of an individual’s self-awareness. The latter two interpretations have become 
increasingly accepted as evidence accumulates that demonstrates that SOA is related to 
certain individual characteristics (e.g., personality; Fletcher & Baldry, 2000) as well as 
important outcomes of interest (e.g., performance and compensation; Ostroff et al., 
2004). 
As previously discussed, interrater reliabilities that include self-ratings tend to be 
the lowest (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988). Self-ratings also tend to be the least valid when 
compared to objective criteria (Ashford, 1989; Mabe & West, 1982; Yammarino & 
Atwater, 1993). However, when Mabe and West (1982) conducted a meta-analytic 
moderator analysis, they found that individuals that were high in intelligence, high in 
achievement status, and had an internal locus of control were able to provide more 
accurate self-evaluations. This analysis was tangential to the variables that they were 
interested in, and therefore, went mostly undiscussed as a theoretical contribution. 
However, this result was merely the first step in building the models of self-other 
agreement. 
Models of Self-Other Agreement.    
Ashford (1989) summarized the then-relatively sparse literature on self-
assessments in organizations and provided a comprehensive model to direct future 
research in the area. Researchers had focused on documenting discrepancies in self- and 
other-assessments of performance, and Ashford wanted her theory to inspire researchers 
to explain why discrepancies existed. An adaptation of her model is shown in Figure 4. 
She outlined three major tasks an employee has to complete in a self-assessment as well 
as three problems that might influence their ability to complete those tasks. Her three so-
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called antecedent problems are: the information problem, where the amount and quality 
of information available to the employee can vary widely and be ambiguous; the ego 
defense problem, where an individual’s self-esteem preservation may lead to avoidance 
of important feedback; and the self-presentation problem, where an employee’s image of 
themselves may interfere with their ability to objectively evaluate feedback. The tasks 
that an individual must complete in a self-assessment are to: 1) establish the link between 
their own behavior and the standard of performance, 2) establish the link between their 
own behavior and the feedback cue, and 3) interpret the relevant cues correctly.  
One outcome in her model of self-assessment is the agreement between the self 
and some other assessor—a 2-by-2 matrix of the agreement space: the self and the other 
determine whether the employee is “on track” or “off track” regarding their goal (See 
Figure 4). Individuals that are in agreement about their performance, Ashford suggested, 
would maintain their current strategies (“on track” agreement) or, in the event of “off 
track” agreement, alter their behavior to try to become “on track” or potentially abandon 
their goal. Individuals with inflated self-views were theorized to persist in their efforts 
until confronted with the others’ views. Individuals with lower self- than other-
assessments, on the other hand, may alter behavior that was actually effective in favor of 
behavior that may not be effective. Ashford also suggested that the organization may be 
affected by self-other discrepancies, but did not make any clear assertions as to their 
nature. 
Yammarino and Atwater (1993) built upon Ashford’s theory, focusing on the 
outcomes of self and other agreement. In their model, individuals could be categorized 
as: an over-estimator (i.e., they rate themselves more highly than others rate them), an 
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accurate estimator (i.e., they rate themselves at a similar level to how others rate them), 
or an under-estimator (i.e., they rate themselves lower than how others rate them). On the 
basis of previous results, they posited that over-estimation would lead to diminished 
organizational and individual outcomes, accurate estimation would lead to enhanced 
outcomes, and under-estimation would lead to mixed outcomes. Specifically, they 
suggested that agreement would affect: self-diagnoses of strengths and weaknesses, 
aspiration level, feedback acceptance and use, job satisfaction, attitudes toward 
supervisors, and goal attainment. Organizational outcomes included career derailment, 
promotions, leadership performance, and training and job performance. They also 
discussed potential individual (e.g., personality, ability, biodata) and environmental (e.g., 
the social environment, job factors) characteristics that might influence the likelihood of 
achieving self-other agreement. 
 Atwater and Yammarino (1997) developed their 1993 model further to include 
elements of Ashford’s (1989) model (i.e., inclusion of self-perception accuracy and its 
determinants) as well as an expansion of the categorization of agreement to a four-group 
model. The model is summarized in Figure 5. The model begins with the accuracy of the 
perception of the self and its proposed determinants: biographical characteristics like age 
and tenure, individual characteristics like personality and locus of control, and cognitive 
processes like beliefs and schemas. This accuracy in self-perception then influences the 
accuracy in the actual rating of the self (i.e., an accurate self-rating is only possible with 
accurate self-perception). In addition, certain job relevant experiences (e.g., previous 
success or feedback) and contextual factors (e.g., political influences, comparative 
information) may influence the self-rating accuracy but not that of the self-perception. 
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These same determinants also affect the accuracy of the other’s rating of the individual 
along with other factors like interpersonal biases (e.g., familiarity, similarity).  
From there, individuals can be categorized as over-estimators, under-estimators, 
or in-agreement good estimators (i.e., agreement that their performance is good), or in-
agreement poor estimators (i.e., agreement that their performance is lacking; similar to 
Ashford’s (1989) model). They then suggested, in addition to the hypotheses from the 
1993 model, that in-agreement good estimators would experience positive individual and 
organizational outcomes and in-agreement poor estimators would experience negative 
outcomes, but less negative outcomes than over-estimators. Outcomes were the same as 
those discussed in 1993, but expanded to include goal-setting behavior, absenteeism, 
organizational commitment, workplace conflicts, and subsequent job performance 
improvement. Their distinction between individual-level and organization-level outcomes 
is somewhat dated—they refer to variables like turnover, commitment, and leader 
performance as organizational outcomes, when they are typically measured at the 
individual level, and have been measured at this level for all of the investigations into this 
area to date. 
Fleenor, McCauley, and Brutus (1996) expanded the four-group model to a six-
group model: they basically expanded the good/poor distinction to both over-estimators 
and under-estimators (rather than only in the in-agreement group as in Atwater & 
Yammarino, 1997). However, the proposal of this model was more a methodological 
contribution than a theoretical one—there were no real propositions as to what might be 
expected or any evidence to support these claims. They simply categorized their sample 
of manager self-ratings and subordinate ratings (of the manager) into both the four-group 
68 
and six-group models and found that the conclusion that would have been drawn using 
the four-group model was not replicated in the six-group model. Modern methods of 
analysis (e.g., polynomial regression, discussed below) have mostly done away with the 
need to explicitly categorize individuals before analysis can be done, but these theories 
have aided in the interpretation of results and the building of hypotheses—much of the 
terminology remains the same, but its operationalization has changed dramatically. 
Methods of Self-Other Agreement.   
The methods of measuring self-other agreement have grown simultaneously with 
the building of its theories. Very early methodology relied on difference scores between 
self-ratings and other ratings. After this approach was repeatedly criticized by Edwards 
(1993, 1994, & 2002), its popularity substantially decreased. To take its place was the 
categorization method first employed by Atwater & Yammarino (1992) and later 
expanded upon by themselves and other researchers (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997; 
Fleenor et al., 2006). The basic approach is this: (1) obtain the average other rating for 
each manager, (2) transform self-ratings and other-ratings into z-scores within rater 
groups, (3) any person with a difference between the scores that exceeded a magnitude of 
1 was considered over- or under-estimators (e.g., individuals that rated themselves more 
than 1 point higher than their other raters did were deemed over-estimators). The 
good/poor categorization was generally determined by the sign of the average other-
rating. However, this approach had many limitations: it suffered from many of the same 
issues as difference scores, the exact method of categorization was never standardized, 
categories were sample-dependent (i.e., an individual may be considered an over-
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estimator in one group but perhaps in-agreement in another), and the categorization 
needlessly made a continuous variable into a discrete variable. 
Interestingly, Edwards suggested that either polynomial regression (1993, 1994, 
& 2002) or multivariate regression (1995) be used when evaluating self-other agreement, 
but the published research did not seem to incorporate these methods as standard until the 
mid-2000s. Multivariate regression is used when agreement is the outcome of interest and 
proceeds as any other multivariate regression. Polynomial regression is used when SOA 
is used as a predictor variable—a three-dimensional surface is constructed which allows 
researchers to keep the ratings as separate continuous variables while also considering 
their effects on the outcome of interest. The procedure has three steps: (1) regress the 
outcome variable on the additive function between the self-ratings and the other ratings, 
(2) add a term for squared self-rating, squared other-rating, and the interaction between 
self- and other-rating; if a significant change in R
2
 is found, proceed to (3) conduct 
response surface tests. Typically, researchers examine both the slope and curvature of the 
lines of perfect agreement and of perfect disagreement to determine how agreement, 
over-estimation, and under-estimation of self-ratings relate to an outcome of interest. 
Predictors of Self-Other Agreement.   
There have been many investigations into which factors predict the likelihood of 
congruence between one’s self-ratings and the ratings of others. The findings can be 
grouped into four categories: demographic characteristics, personality characteristics, 
contextual factors, and measurement characteristics. Findings in each of these areas will 
be discussed.  
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Demographic Characteristics. Gender of the target individual has been 
examined as a correlate of self-other agreement with some regularity. Male participants 
have been found to over-rate themselves more frequently than female participants in their 
leadership effectiveness (Brutus, Fleenor, & McCauley, 1999; Vecchio & Anderson, 
2009), sales and marketing skills (Lindeman, Sundvik, & Rouhianen, 1995), job 
performance (Patiar & Mia, 2008), specific abilities (i.e., mathematical, spatial, and 
kinesthetic abilities; Visser, Ashton, & Vernon, 2008), and competency ratings (Jones & 
Fletcher, 2002). This finding is not entirely consistent, however. Some researchers have 
found that gender does not affect self-other agreement (e.g., Van Velson, Taylor, & 
Leslie, 1993) and others’ data suggest that the effect is not due to males over-rating 
themselves but in fact is due to others rating females more highly than males (Ostroff, 
Atwater, & Feinberg, 2004). Another possible explanation is that women tend to be more 
accepting of and responsive to feedback from others (Roberts & Hoeksema, 1989; 
Roberts, 1991). Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema (1994) found that this effect was due to 
women tending to view others’ ratings of their performance as more accurate than men 
do, thus incorporating more information into their self-perception. 
The age of the target individual tends to affect the degree of self-other agreement. 
Researchers have repeatedly found that older raters tend to over-rate themselves in many 
domains: in their job performance (Brutus, Fleenor, & McCauley, 1999; Ferris, Yates, 
Gilmore, & Rowland, 1985; Lawler, 1967), their scholastic achievement (Bailey & 
Bailey, 1974), their managerial effectiveness (Vecchio & Anderson, 2009), their 
transformational leadership (Moshavi, Brown, & Dodd, 2003), and their leadership 
behaviors (Ostroff, et al., 2004). However, Ostroff, Atwater, and Feinberg (2004) noted 
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that this effect in their data was due to older managers rating themselves more highly 
than did younger managers while the other raters (subordinates, peers, and supervisors) 
tended to rate older managers lower than they rated younger managers. Shore and 
Blieken (1991), on the other hand, found that middle-aged workers had the least self-
supervisor agreement compared to older and younger employees. 
The organizational level at which the person operates (e.g., middle manager, 
division lead, executive) is highly correlated with their age (Ostroff et al., 2004) and as a 
result has been found to be correlated with a lack of self-other agreement (Brief, Aldag, 
& Van Sell, 1977; Brutus, Fleenor, & McCauley, 1999; Gentry, Hannum, Ekelund, & de 
Jong, 2007; Ostroff et al., 2004; Sala, 2003). This effect may be due, in part, to decreased 
feedback-seeking behavior in more tenured employees compared to their less tenured 
counterparts (Ashford, 1986). Interestingly, however, leaders have been found to have 
higher levels of agreement with others’ ratings than individuals in non-leadership roles 
(Gallo & McClintock, 1962; Green, 1948; Greer, Galanter, & Nordie, 1954; Lansing, 
1957). Similarly, Bailey and Fletcher (2002) found that, over time, leaders tend to 
increase their agreement with their supervisors’ and subordinates’ ratings. 
Only two studies have examined the race of the individual as a predictor of self-
other agreement. Ostroff et al. (2004) found that non-white managers tended to rate 
themselves more highly than did white managers on their managerial effectiveness, but 
that others did not rate differentially based on race—suggesting that non-white managers 
tended to over-rate themselves more than white managers. However, Vecchio and 
Anderson (2009) found no effect of race on self-other agreement of managerial 
effectiveness. Both samples were large (>1,000), from multiple organizations, and used a 
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large-item inventory. However, Ostroff et al. (2004) aggregated others’ ratings within 
categories whereas Vecchio and Anderson (2009) randomly selected one response from 
each category.   
Finally, Ostroff et al. (2004) also examined the effects of education level and 
years of experience as a manager on self-other agreement. They found a positive 
correlation between years of experience as a manager and tendency to over-rate. 
Interestingly, they found a positive correlation between manager education level and 
level of ratings by themselves and by others (i.e., self- and other-rated performance trends 
upward with education level) and self-other agreement (i.e., more highly educated 
managers are more likely to rate themselves at similar levels as their other raters). Less 
educated managers tended to over-rate themselves.  
Personality Characteristics. Only a few studies have examined the effects of 
personality traits on self-other agreement directly. Fletcher and Baldry (2000) found that 
certain sub-dimensions of the big five (as measured by the 16PF, Cattell, Eber, & 
Tatsuoka, 1970) were correlated with self-supervisor agreement—agreeableness 
(detached—outgoing) and openness (conservative—experimenting) were positively 
correlated and neuroticism (forthright—shrewd) was negatively correlated with self-other 
agreement. Brutus et al. (1999) found that only social dominance was negatively 
correlated with self-other agreement in all categories of other ratings, while other 
characteristics like social presence and communality were predictive of only self-peer or 
self-other agreement. Goffin and Anderson (2007) found that managers with higher self-
esteem were more likely to over-rate their job performance.  
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Other researchers have examined the differential effect of personality on self and 
other ratings separately, but did not examine self-other congruence as an outcome. Self-
other agreement was not the primary focus in Judge, LePine, and Rich (2006), but the 
results suggest that narcissism, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness are all positively related to self-ratings of leadership behavior, but were 
not predictive of others’ ratings. Similarly, Bell and Arthur (2008) found that 
extraversion was positively related to participants’ self-ratings of performance but were 
not related to their assessors’ ratings. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that 
personality may be related to self-other agreement but few have directly examined these 
relationships. 
Contextual Factors. The setting in which the ratings are being made can have a 
large influence on self-other agreement, generally through the deflation of self-ratings. If 
the self-rater is made aware that their ratings can or will be checked or compared to 
objective criterion measures, they tend to make more accurate ratings (Farh & Werbel, 
1986; Heidemeier & Moser, 2009; Mabe & West, 1982; Regan, Gesselink, Hubsch, & 
Ulsh, 1975). Early results suggested that self-ratings tend to be inflated when used for 
evaluative (rather than developmental) purposes (Farh & Werbel, 1986), but some recent 
results indicate that ratings for developmental purposes tend to be inflated relative to 
ratings for research-only purposes (Heidemeier & Moser, 2009). 
Similarly, culture of the individual (i.e., not organizational culture) has been 
shown to affect self-other agreement through differences in self-ratings. Individuals 
living in collectivist cultures tend to rate themselves lower than individuals from more 
individualistic cultures on leadership behavior (Atwater, Wang, Smither, & Fleenor, 
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2009) and on job performance (Farh, Dobbins, & Cheng, 1991; Farh & Cheng, 1997; 
Yik, Bond, & Paulhus, 1998). Similar results were found by Xie, Roy, and Chen (2006) 
when they measured individual orientations toward individualism/collectivism rather than 
using the country-level variables. In direct investigations of self-other agreement, 
differences across cultures in self-other agreement have been due to differences in self-
ratings and not due to changes in other-ratings (Gentry, Braddy, Fleenor, & Howard, 
2008; Gentry, Yip, & Hannum, 2010). 
Measurement Characteristics.  A few characteristics of the measurement 
instrument itself have been correlated to increased self-other agreement. Self-raters that 
have been provided with comparative information about their peers’ performance tend to 
have increased validity of their self-ratings (i.e., their correlation with objective 
performance criteria; Farh & Dobbins, 1989). Furthermore, when self-ratings and other-
ratings are made using a common frame of reference there is more congruence in their 
ratings (Farh, Werbel, & Bedian, 1988; Steel & Ovalle, 1984).  
Wohlers and London (1989) found that there is higher self-other agreement on 
scales whose managerial behavior items were observable and clearly defined. Felson 
(1981) found that football players were more likely to over-rate themselves on ambiguous 
abilities (e.g., mental toughness) than on more concrete ones (e.g., strength). Similarly, 
Rothermund, Bak, and Brandtstädter (2005) found that students rated themselves more 
highly on dimensions that were less controllable (e.g., interest in science) than they did 
on controllable characteristics (e.g., class attendance). 
Outcomes of Self-Other Agreement.   
75 
Ashford’s (1993) theory included self-other agreement as an outcome of the self-
appraisal process only, but more recent theories have suggested that there are other 
potential outcomes associated with this congruence. It is important to note here that 
comparing self- and other-ratings does not assert that other-ratings are the “true” score 
and that variability between the two is simply error. While it has been shown that self-
ratings tend to be less valid than other-ratings (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988), it is 
important in most work settings to have a working knowledge of how others perceive 
oneself. That is, many important individual outcomes are not determined solely by the 
individual’s performance but indeed by how their performance is perceived by others 
(e.g., a supervisor’s perception of one’s performance likely influences promotions, raises, 
etc.). Atwater and Yammarino (1997) posited many possible outcomes of self-other 
agreement—some of them have garnered much research interest (e.g., job performance, 
goal setting), others have gotten very little (e.g., aspiration level), and some unexpected 
variables have been examined (e.g., derailment).  
Job Performance. Much of the early work on self-other agreement focused on 
the relationship between rating congruence and the performance of those getting 
feedback. Early results suggest that individual contributors and leaders that have a higher 
level of agreement with their raters tend to be better performers and are more successful 
and effective on the job than those who disagree with others’ ratings (Atwater & 
Yammarino, 1992; Bass & Yammarino, 1991; Flocco, 1969; Furnham & Stringfield, 
1994; Jennings, 1943; Sosik & Megerian, 1999; Williams & Leavitt, 1947). Some more 
recent results suggested that there was no relationship between self-other agreement and 
leader performance (Fleenor, McCauley, & Brutus, 1996; Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, 
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& Fleenor, 1998; Brutus, Fleenor, & Tisak, 1999). However, these studies used dated 
analytical techniques (e.g., the categorization method) and/or used somewhat flawed 
logic (e.g., using supervisor ratings as “true” scores).  
Investigations without these flaws have yielded positive results. Atwater, 
Waldman, Ostroff, Robie, and Johnson (2005) used a supervisory rating as the outcome 
variable in a series of polynomial regressions, but they used a different supervisor than 
the one that provided the “other” rating as well as a separate scale. Ostroff, Atwater, and 
Feinberg (2004) used objective criteria (e.g., compensation and organizational level) in 
addition to a second rating by a supervisor. Results from these studies suggest that there 
is a positive relationship between self-other agreement and job performance outcomes 
studied at one point in time.  
Some researchers have also examined the effect of self-other agreement on 
improvement in later performance after receiving feedback, not just a static level of 
performance. Smither, London, Vasilopoulos, Reilly, Millsap, and Salvemini (1995) 
examined the effects of upward feedback (i.e., feedback from subordinates to their 
manager) on subsequent managerial performance. They found that managers who had 
low to moderate initial performance levels tended to increase in their performance 
ratings—except those who had agreed with their subordinates on their low performance. 
Similarly, Atwater, Roush, and Fischthal (1995) found that followers’ ratings of their 
managers’ performance increased (after 18 weeks) following the manager’s receipt of 
feedback such that leaders that over-rated themselves improved but those that under-rated 
themselves did not. Johnson and Ferstl (1999) confirmed these findings once again with a 
sample of accounting firm managers that were given upward feedback, after a one year 
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gap between time periods. Walker and Smither (1999) found that, after a five year period, 
managers improved their multisource feedback ratings most when they met with their 
direct reports to discuss the previous years’ ratings. 
Assessment Center Performance.  Assessment center performance (AC; Rupp et 
al., 2015) has been used as the criterion on several occasions to estimate the effect that 
self-other agreement might have on performance without reliance on ratings. Nowack 
(1997) found that assessors rated over-estimators and in-agreement/good raters higher on 
overall AC performance than they did under-estimators and in-agreement/bad raters. 
Similar results were found for the in-basket task performance as well. Atkins and Wood 
(2002) conducted a series of polynomial regressions that predicted AC performance from 
self-ratings and others’ (supervisors, peers, and a combined other) ratings of managerial 
effectiveness. Results suggested that supervisors accurately rated over-estimators (i.e., 
correctly rated them as average when they rated themselves above average) but 
underrated under-estimators (i.e., the supervisor and target agreed that their performance 
was low, but their AC performance was high), while peers tended to over-rate across all 
levels of AC performance.  
Performance in a developmental assessment center (DAC)—an assessment center 
administered to change an employee’s behavior, rather than to predict managerial success 
(Jones & Whitmore, 1995)—has also been examined as it relates to self-other agreement. 
Woo, Sims, Rupp, and Gibbons (2008) found that participants who over-estimated their 
DAC performance relative to their assessor were less behaviorally engaged (i.e., active 
participation in the DAC, as rated by the assessor) in the developmental program than 
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were under-raters. There was no correlation, however, between in-agreement pattern (i.e., 
high and low) and behavioral engagement. 
Job Attitudes.  Atwater and Yammarino (1997) posited that various job attitudes 
(e.g., job satisfaction, positive affect) would be influenced by self-rating accuracy. 
Specifically, they suggested that individuals that over-rate themselves would tend to 
experience negative attitudes and that those in agreement would tend to experience 
positive attitudes. Sosik (2001) tested this hypothesis directly by assessing the difference 
in organizational trust and organizational commitment of supervisors who were 
categorized according to their self-subordinate rating agreement. They found that 
supervisors who were in-agreement with their subordinates’ ratings of their leadership 
performance had more trust than both under-estimators and over-estimators. In addition, 
results suggested that in-agreement raters and (unexpectedly) over-estimators had higher 
levels of organizational commitment than did under-estimators. While Atwater and 
Yammarino (1997) theorized only about the job attitudes of the self (i.e., the manager), 
many researchers have examined the job attitudes of the subordinate. 
Szell and Henderson (1997) found that self-subordinate agreement was related to 
both increased job satisfaction (specifically with supervision, growth, and social aspects 
of the job) and increased organizational commitment (specifically with identification with 
the organization) of the subordinate. Sosik (2001) examined the idea that self-subordinate 
agreement on leadership ratings would influence organizational commitment and trust. 
He found a significant effect for agreement and subordinate trust: subordinates of over-
estimators had the least amount of trust, followed by those of in-agreement raters, while 
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subordinates of under-estimators had the most trust in their organization. He failed to find 
a significant effect for organizational commitment.  
Similarly, Moshavi, Brown, and Dodd (2003) found that subordinates of under-
estimators were more satisfied with their jobs and supervisors than subordinates that were 
in-agreement with their supervisor; both groups were more satisfied with their jobs and 
supervisors than those supervised by over-estimators. They also found that subordinates 
of under-estimators and in-agreement raters reported that they were more productive than 
those subordinate to over-estimators. However, they did not find an effect of self-other 
agreement on intent to leave the company.  
There is also evidence to suggest that these effects are relevant outside of 
supervisor-subordinate relationships. Godshalk and Sosik (2000) found that self-other 
agreement in mentor-mentee relationships (about the mentor’s transformational 
leadership abilities) was positively related to mentee perceptions of the quality of the 
relationship—mentees of under-estimators experienced the highest levels of psychosocial 
support, career development, and mentoring effectiveness. Sosik and Godshalk (2004) 
successfully replicated these results. 
Promotion.  A few researchers have examined promotions, or rated 
promotability, as a potential outcome of self-other agreement. This comes directly from 
Atwater and Yammarino (1997) as well—they hypothesized that both over-estimators 
and under-estimators would “dramatically misdiagnose strengths and weaknesses and 
make very poor job-relevant decisions” (p. 158-159).  Bass and Yammarino (1991) used 
a criterion that consisted of a combination of a supervisor’s performance rating and their 
recommendation (or lack thereof) for early promotion of a sample of naval officers. They 
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found that officers that were in-agreement with their subordinates were more successful 
than those that were not in agreement. Later, Atwater & Yammarino (1992) used the 
same criterion measure with naval academy students and found similar results: the 
correlations between leadership behavior and performance were highest for officers who 
agreed with their subordinates’ ratings of their leadership behavior. Rather than a 
composite including promotion recommendation ratings or promotability ratings 
themselves, Halverson, Tonidandel, Barlow, and Dipboye (2002) examined promotion 
rate directly. They found, through polynomial regression, that self-subordinate agreement 
on leadership ratings was the most predictive of promotion rate compared to self-peer and 
self-supervisor agreement: those that were high in agreement also had the highest 
promotion rate.  
Derailment. The Center for Creative Leadership ignited research into managerial 
derailment—involuntary failure (i.e., plateau in performance, demotion, or firing) of high 
level executives in the eyes of the organization (McCall & Lombardo, 1983). Initial 
researchers focused on exploring why derailment happened; a later group investigated the 
base rate of self-other agreement on derailment behaviors. They found that discrepancies 
between self-ratings and other-ratings of derailment behaviors occurs in many cultures in 
studies of European managers (Gentry, Ekelund, Hannum, & Jong, 2007) Hispanic 
managers (Gentry, Braddy, Fleenor, & Howard, 2008), and Chinese managers (Gentry, 
Yip, & Hannum, 2010). Tang, Dai, and De Meuse (2010) investigated whether self-other 
agreement on derailment behavior could predict managerial effectiveness. Managers who 
under-rated themselves on derailment behavior were found as less effective that those 
that over-rated themselves, and those that were in-agreement about their high ratings 
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were less effective than in-agreement low raters.  Subsequently, Braddy, Gooty, Fleenor, 
and Yammarino (2014) examined the relationship between self and other (direct report, 
peer, and supervisor) ratings of leadership behavior to predict derailment potential. They 
found that: (1) peer ratings of leader behavior were the most predictive of derailment 
potential, and (2) derailment is least likely to occur when self-ratings are lower than 
other-ratings and when self- and other-ratings converge on higher ratings of leader 
behaviors.  
Present Study 
The following section will begin with an outline of the major and minor 
overarching contributions that the results of the present study will make to the self-other 
agreement and feedback literatures. In addition, the three research questions that are 
addressed through the course of this dissertation will be introduced, along with the 
rationale and a short review of the relevant literatures to each question. 
Major Contributions 
In the previous section I have outlined evidence that suggests that self-other 
agreement in performance ratings can be influenced by both person and situation 
variables and that self-other rating congruence is associated with positive individual work 
outcomes.  However, there are certain areas that researchers have not yet addressed for 
which the present study will provide some major contributions. First, the vast majority of 
the research in self-other agreement has been conducted on upward feedback (i.e. 
feedback from subordinate to a supervisor) while downward feedback (i.e. supervisory 
ratings of subordinate performance) has been largely ignored, except for its use as a 
criterion. Another major contribution of the present study stems from its longitudinal 
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design—although some researchers have examined time-lagged effects of feedback (e.g. 
Smither, London, & Reilly, 2005), only one study was located that used a longitudinal 
design (i.e. collection of data at three or more time points) to understand the effects of 
feedback and self-other agreement (Reilly, Smither, & Vasilopoulos, 1996). As a result of 
this design, modern analytical techniques are used here to answer three basic questions: 
(1) What is the nature of self-supervisor agreement of performance ratings over time?, (2) 
What impact does self-supervisor agreement have on important individual level work 
outcomes?, and (3) Does receipt of other forms of performance feedback impact self-
supervisor agreement? 
In addition to answering these major questions, the present study makes the 
following minor contributions to the literature: it provides evidence from a multi-year 
longitudinal study; it provides data from a mixed sample of both people leaders and 
individual contributors; it uses modern methodology and data analysis techniques; and it 
uses objective performance-related criteria (i.e. not performance rating outcomes). Each 
of these avenues of research has limited empirical evidence available. 
Research Questions 
The Nature of Agreement.  There is some evidence to suggest that individuals 
tend to increase in agreement with other raters of their performance over time. Reilly et 
al. (1996) found that the mean difference between self and subordinate ratings of 
managers’ performance from a variety of industries and organizations decreased across 
four time periods, with one year between each wave. However, they did not examine the 
relationship between self and supervisory ratings of performance, as they used 
supervisory ratings as the criterion. Similarly, Bailey and Fletcher (2002) sampled 
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managers from an automotive services organization that participated in a mandatory 
multisource feedback procedure (receiving feedback from their supervisor and two 
subordinates) two years apart. They found that the correlation between self and 
subordinate ratings increased and the mean difference between self and subordinate 
ratings decreased—together suggesting an increase in rating congruence—between the 
two time periods. It should be noted, however, that the sample size was very modest (N = 
34). Therefore, there is no direct evidence that speaks to the nature of the relationship of 
self-ratings with supervisory ratings over time. Thus, the present study addresses the 
following questions regarding the nature of self-supervisor agreement on annual 
performance ratings: 
1) What is the general trend of self-manager agreement on annual performance 
feedback (i.e., do employees tend to agree or disagree with their managers, and in 
what direction)? 
2) What does this trend look like over time (i.e., do employees tend to diverge from 
or converge with their managers’ ratings)? 
Outcomes of Agreement.  After the nature of the relationship between self-and 
supervisor ratings has been elucidated, an understanding of what effects, if any, this 
agreement has on important individual level outcomes will be investigated. In terms of its 
effect on job performance, the vast majority of studies to date have used supervisory 
ratings of performance as the criterion, using self-subordinate or self-peer agreement as 
the predictor (e.g. Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, & Fleenor, 1998). Only two studies 
were located which used more objective criteria as indicators of job performance. Ostroff, 
Atwater, and Feinberg (2004) used compensation level (i.e. salary) and organizational 
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level as outcome variables in polynomial regressions of self-other agreement in three 
“other” categories: peer, subordinate, and supervisor. They found that self-other 
agreement was related to these outcome variables in expected ways: (1) agreement on 
high levels of behavior was related to higher compensation and higher organizational 
levels than at low levels of agreement, (2) over-estimators had higher compensation and 
organizational levels than under-estimators, and (3) compensation was lower as 
congruence between ratings decreased (there was no significant effect for organizational 
level). Halverson et al. (2002) used a similar methodology to examine the effects of self-
other agreement on the promotion rate of US Air Force personnel. They found that only 
self-subordinate agreement was significantly related to a measure of promotion rate and 
timeliness. It is possible, however, that the lack of effect for self-supervisor agreement in 
this case may be due to the fact that the ratings were made of leadership performance. 
This would, in turn, potentially be most accurately assessed by the followers themselves 
and therefore most related to promotions. Similarly, both of these studies were conducted 
at one point in time (or in the case of Halverson et al., 2002, made a longitudinal variable 
into a static metric). One question that remains unanswered is how self-supervisor 
agreement may affect the trajectory of these variables over time. Thus, the present study 
addresses: 
3) How does annual performance agreement impact important longitudinal 
employee-level outcomes (e.g., salary, merit-based pay raises, promotions, 
organizational level) in terms of: 
a) Intercept effects (e.g., do individuals that start at higher organizational levels 
tend to agree with their manager more?) 
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b) Slope effects (e.g., do individuals that agree with their manager more tend to 
experience steeper salary trajectories than those that disagree?) 
Relatedly, researchers have not yet investigated the effects of self-supervisor agreement 
on certain dichotomous outcomes like turnover or supervisor change of the individual 
receiving downward feedback. The closest researchers have come is investigating job 
attitudes (e.g. satisfaction, commitment) which may in turn be related to outcomes like 
turnover. However, most researchers have investigated the effects of self-subordinate 
agreement on the job-related attitudes of the subordinate (e.g., Szell & Henderson, 1997). 
That is, they typically study the job attitudes of the rater rather than the attitudes of the 
ratee. One exception was located: Sosik (2001) found that increased self-subordinate 
agreement on ratings of charismatic leadership was associated with increased trust and 
organizational commitment of the manager (i.e., the self rater). Thus, it appears that 
agreement may influence certain job attitudes, which may in turn affect behaviors like 
turnover. Thus, the following question is addressed: 
4) How does self-manager agreement relate to important dichotomous outcomes 
(i.e., turnover, changing supervisors)? 
Effects of Feedback.  Feedback has been demonstrated to be an effective tool at 
influencing future job-related behavior, especially at future job performance (e.g. Kluger 
& DeNisi, 1996). It has also been demonstrated that previous participation in a feedback 
session can influence rating behavior in future sessions with the same tool. For example, 
as previously discussed, Bailey and Fletcher (2002) demonstrated that self-other 
agreement can increase between administrations of the same instrument. However, it 
remains unclear what effect that receipt of feedback has on rating behavior in other rating 
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exercises. In other words, does receiving feedback in one exercise make a rater more 
aware of their performance, in general, and therefore rate themselves more closely to how 
others rate them in other exercises? Thus: 
5) How does taking part in a 360 feedback session affect subsequent agreement on 
the annual performance feedback? 
In addition, there is a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that the effects of self-
other agreement vary considerably based on the relative relationship of the self to the 
other. For example, in their meta-analysis Smither, London, and Reilly (2005) found that 
the longitudinal effects of feedback on performance were strongest for feedback from 
direct reports and peers, weak for feedback from supervisors, and basically non-existent 
for feedback from the self. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that the effects of self-
other agreement within one feedback tool may affect self-other agreement on another to 
differing degrees:  
a) Does agreement level within the 360 assessment itself moderate this 
relationship? 
b) If so, are there certain groups for which agreement in the 360 assessment is 
more predictive of future agreement? 
Method 
Participants 
Historical annual performance, annual salary, pay raise, and organizational level 
data were taken from a sample of 4,630 employees from a large, Midwestern member-
owned agricultural cooperative for the years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Of these, 
3,541 individuals were included in the longitudinal data analysis—the others were 
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eliminated because they had fewer than three time periods of rating data. Employees 
consisted of both managers and individual contributors. Multisource feedback data come 
from a sample of 172 employees. 
Measures 
Annual Performance Review.  The annual review process at this company 
requires that the individual employee rate themselves on their previous year’s 
performance and their managers rate them for the previous year’s performance on a 5-
point scale, with both ratings happening around the same time in January. The behavioral 
anchors for each rating value are included in Table 1. Managers have access to the 
employees’ self-ratings before they conduct their ratings. Performance discussion 
meetings are scheduled to happen between manager and employee sometime in March. 
Competency Ratings.  In order to justify the use of the single-item performance 
rating, individual competency ratings from the year 2015 were used. Employees are rated 
on a 5-point scale for each competency in a process that is separate from the annual 
performance review, but around the same time of year. The competency model was 
developed by Korn Ferry in 2014 on the basis of a series of interviews with senior 
leadership members of the cooperative. It includes typical performance dimensions such 
as decision-making, innovation, and productivity. The complete list of performance 
dimensions and their descriptions can be found in Table 2. 
360 Feedback Tool.  The multisource feedback tool is primarily used as a 
developmental procedure within a larger leadership development program of higher 
performing, high potential employees, but is also occasionally used with low performing 
employees whose manager wants to provide them developmental feedback. However, 
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regardless of the context of the survey, its responses are used for developmental purposes 
only. Its items evaluate similar dimensions to those in the leadership competency model. 
All items are rated on a six-point Likert scale by a minimum of three other raters from 
four rater categories: managers, peers, direct reports, or others (e.g. customers or clients). 
A complete list of items is available in Appendix A. Not all participants received the 
same subset of items. 
Individual Outcome Variables. There are a total of 6 outcome variables in this 
study: 4 are continuous and 2 are dichotomous in nature. The four continuous variables’ 
(salary, organizational level, pay raise rate, and promotion rate) data were collected for 
all participants, beginning from 2011. Salary data was simply the individual’s numeric 
salary in USD at any point in time, but for the purposes of constructing trajectories, the 
natural log of the salary variable was used. Pay raise and promotion data were simply the 
cumulative number of times that an individual experienced that event; as such, these 
values were square-rooted to create trajectories. For these transformed variables, the 
estimated intercept values were re-transformed to their initial metric to aid in 
interpretation. Organizational level at this organization can vary from 1 to 53, with the 
majority of the sample working between levels 5 and 15. The process by which 
individual trajectories and intercepts were modelled is described below. The two 
dichotomous variables in this study were employee turnover and change in supervisor 
that was not due to supervisor promotion or supervisor turnover. Each individual was 
given a value that corresponded to whether or not they had experienced the event in the 
course of their employment.  
Analyses 
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The Nature of Agreement.  In order to describe the nature of longitudinal 
agreement (i.e. answer the second research question) two linear mixed-effects models 
were constructed: one that regressed self-ratings of job performance on a time variable 
and another that regressed managerial ratings of performance on the time variable. Below 
is a formal specification of the model for the ith time point for the jth individual: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾10(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗  
As a result, individuals had four data points: the slope and intercept of their performance 
trajectory as rated by themselves and the slope and intercept of their performance 
trajectory as rated by their manager. In order to categorize individuals according to their 
agreement, confidence intervals were constructed around each of these values using the 
standard error of these estimates. Individuals could rate themselves higher, lower, or 
equal to their mangers for both their intercepts and their slopes. Thus, an individual could 
fit into one of nine categories of agreement on the basis of these differences (see Table 
3). 
Outcomes of Agreement.  Individual intercepts and slopes for the four continuous 
organizational outcomes were constructed in an identical manner to the performance 
trajectories as described above (i.e. with each outcome regressed onto a time variable in a 
linear mixed effects model). Variables were transformed as appropriate (e.g. the square 
root of number of merit-based pay raises was taken, given that it is a count variable) 
before putting them into the mixed effects model. The individual slope and intercept 
values were then calculated and converted back into interpretable metrics if the outcome 
had been transformed. 
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Then, the outcome slopes and intercepts were used as the outcome variable in a 
series of regressions, where the outcome slope and intercept were separately regressed 
first on the linear combination of the self-rating and the manager-rating, then on a 
combination of the ratings and the squared terms of the ratings (i.e. a polynomial 
regression). In addition, polynomial regression analyses were also separately run with a 
number of control variables—employee ethnicity, gender, and tenure—included in both 
the simple linear and polynomial models.  Only when the quadratic model provided 
significantly better fit than the simple linear model were response surfaces analyzed. 
For the dichotomous outcomes (supervisor change and turnover) survival analyses 
using the Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimator were conducted. For the supervisor change, 
individuals were only included as having changed a supervisor if the supervisor change 
did not occur due to supervisor turnover. Similarly, for the turnover analysis individuals 
were only considered to have turned over when they did so for reasons outside of their 
control (e.g. retirement, divestiture). A baseline model predicting each event was 
compared to another model (using the Mantel-Haenszel test) which included the 
categories of agreement as established above to determine whether agreement had any 
effect on the effect’s occurrence. 
Effects of Feedback.  In order to assess whether participation in a multisource 
feedback procedure affects future agreement, a series of linear mixed effects models were 
conducted on the performance appraisal data from those who participated in the program. 
The baseline model was that which was described in the Nature of Agreement section 
above; it was applied to both manager and self ratings of performance separately. Then a 
model was fit which could test for a change in intercept after feedback and a model which 
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could test for a change in slope after feedback. A model which included terms for both 
changes in intercept and slope after feedback simultaneously was fit when at least one of 
these previous models had significantly better fit than the baseline model. 
Results 
Use of Single Rating 
As previously mentioned, this study relies on the use of a single rating of job 
performance, measured at one point in time, to attempt to capture a whole year’s worth of 
performance data. To attempt to address this issue, a principal component analysis was 
constructed. Using a single year’s worth of data, ratings made by the supervisor on the 
subordinate’s behavior for each of the competencies in the business’s competency model 
were rotated—93% of the variance in competency scores was accounted for by a single 
component. Single performance ratings were highly correlated with the component scores 
(r = 0.81). Therefore, we believed the single rating of performance to be “good enough” 
to proceed with the remainder of the analyses. 
The Nature of Agreement 
To address the first research question, simple descriptive and agreement statistics 
of the self and managerial ratings were conducted (see Tables 4 and 5). The means for 
each year’s self and manager ratings were relatively high (always near 3.5) but were 
relatively variable (ratings SDs near 0.7). The average difference between self and 
manager ratings was also relatively low for all five years (largest difference -0.11), but 
variable (SDs near 0.8). Basic agreement statistics also suggested that there was an 
acceptable level of disagreement in annual performance ratings to proceed with the 
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analysis (ρ ~ 0.44; κ ~ 0.3) and that point-in-time agreement was highly variable. See 
Figure 6 for a histogram of each year’s differences in ratings. 
The longitudinal nature of agreement was also found to have good variability. The 
largest category represented in this sample was Reformed Overraters (39%)—individuals 
that initially over-rated themselves but whose slope indicates that they would converge 
with their manager’s ratings. Refomed Underraters were the next most common category 
(20%), followed by Serial Overraters (17%), Serial Underraters (11%), Consistent 
Overraters (5%), Consistent Underraters (3%), and Inflated Agreers (3%). The least 
represented groups were the Consistent Agreers (1%) and Deflated Agreers (1%).  
Outcomes of Agreement 
Before considering the results from these analyses, it should be noted that the 
tables containing the numerical results of the linear and polynomial models fit to these 
data are only readily interpretable for the simple linear results. The quadratic models’ 
results are difficult to interpret in and of themselves—they serve more to generate the 
response surfaces from which conclusions are drawn. Thus, it is most appropriate to 
examine the numeric tables only when better fit is not achieved by the quadratic model 
over the linear model. Alternatively, when the quadratic model does fit the data better 
than the linear model, it is best to consult the corresponding response surface figure. 
A response surface can have three shapes: (1) concave, where it is dome shaped, 
(2) convex, where it is shaped like a bowl, or (3) saddle, which has both upward and 
downward curves. Examination of the surface along the line of agreement (where X = Y) 
and along the line of disagreement (where X = -Y; perpendicular to the line of 
agreement) also helps to illustrate the effect of agreement on the outcome of interest. 
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Another approach is to examine the four corners of the X-Y plot—the level of the 
outcome associated with agreement at the high and low levels of the X-Y scale and the 
level of the outcome associated with disagreement—where one value is high and the 
other low, and vice-versa. For the following analyses, there are two different sets of X 
and Y variables, for which we might expect different plot shapes: (1) initial performance 
ratings (ratings at time 0 for a given individual) and (2) performance rating trajectories 
(whether ratings of performance increase or decrease at similar rates).  
For initial performance rating agreement, if agreement is universally better, we 
would expect to find a concave surface with the highest values occurring along the line of 
agreement, with decreasing values as the surface moves away from this line, and with the 
lowest values occurring at the perfect disagreement corners of the plot (see Figure 7A). 
However, we would expect agreement to have differential effects on the outcomes based 
on the level of performance that is agreed upon. Therefore we would expect more of a 
saddle-like shape surface. Along the line of agreement the outcome is positively linearly 
related to the outcome—individuals that agree with their manager about high 
performance have higher outcomes than those that agree about low levels of 
performance. We might also expect that the surface appear in a negative U-shape along 
the line of disagreement—outcomes tend to decrease as disagreement becomes more 
severe (see Figure 7B). Thus, the set of analyses that use initial performance ratings as 
the predictors answer the question: does the level of performance influence the effect of 
agreement on outcomes (both point-in-time and trajectories), or is agreement universally 
better than disagreement? 
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For performance rating trajectories the interpretation is a bit more complex. It 
answers the question: Does agreement in performance rating growth (or decline) affect 
outcome growth (or decline)? In the case in which giving oneself similar rating slopes to 
the manager (i.e. longitudinal agreement) is best, we would expect a concave plot similar 
to the first scenario above. Similarly, we might expect an increasing relationship along 
the line of agreement—suggesting that agreeing about growing performance is associated 
with higher levels of the outcome than agreeing about declining performance (see Figure 
7C). 
However, in the case in which convergence over time is the best, we would expect 
a saddle-shaped plot, with an upward U-shape along the line of disagreement and a 
downward or flat curve along the line of agreement (see Figure 7D). This is because we 
know from previous analyses that individuals that have different slopes in their self-
ratings than their managers’ ratings are more likely to be converging with their managers’ 
ratings than diverging from them. Of individuals that differ from their manager’s rating 
initially and have different slopes, 74% of them are “reformed” raters rather than “serial” 
raters. Individuals at the corner of the plot where their manager’s slope is positive and 
their own is negative are more likely to be reformed over-raters than they are to be serial 
under-raters, and individuals at the corner of the plot where their manager’s slope is 
negative while theirs is positive are more likely to be reformed under-raters than serial 
over-raters. 
Continuous outcomes without control variables.  For the first outcome variable 
of interest (salary) two polynomial regressions provided increased fit over the simple 
linear model: initial agreement predicted both initial salary and salary trajectories.  
95 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the response surfaces for these results, respectively. Agreement 
over time, however, did not predict salary trajectories—the quadratic form of the model 
did not fit significantly better than the simple linear model. The form of the simple linear 
model suggests that the slope of the self-ratings predicts salary trajectories the best. A 
summary of all the models fit to the salary data can be found in Table 6. 
For the outcome of starting salary, initial agreement is predictive but varies as a 
function of the performance level upon which there is agreement. The form of the 
response surface along the line of perfect agreement is curvilinear: this suggests that 
initial agreement about both high and low performance is associated with high initial 
salary, while agreement about moderate performance is associated with the lowest initial 
salaries. Initial disagreement about performance is positively linearly related to initial 
salary as a function of performance level such that high self-ratings with low manager 
ratings is associated with higher compensation than is low self-ratings with high manager 
ratings.  
Perhaps more interestingly, salary trajectories were also predicted by initial 
agreement. Similar to the above results, agreement is not unilaterally associated with 
positive outcomes, but is variable on the level of performance upon which there is 
agreement. Examination of the response surface along the line of perfect agreement 
suggests that initial agreement about low performance is associated with negative salary 
trajectories and agreement on high levels of performance is associated with the steepest 
salary trajectories. The surface along the line of perfect disagreement tells an interesting 
story: initial disagreement over high performance is much more detrimental to an 
individual’s salary trajectory than is initial disagreement over low performance. 
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Interestingly, initial low-self ratings, if paired with low manager ratings are associated 
with the lowest (i.e. negative) salary trajectories but if they are paired with high manager 
ratings, they are associated with the highest salary trajectories.  
For promotion rate, only promotion trajectories were used as outcomes because 
all employees start with no promotions (i.e. all intercepts are theoretically 0). Initial 
agreement did not predict promotion rate—again, the quadratic model did not achieve 
significantly better fit than did the simple linear model. The form of the linear model 
suggests that the initial ratings by the manager are the most predictive of promotion 
slopes.  
Agreement over time, however, did predict promotion rate (response surface is in 
Figure 10). The response surface along the line of agreement is flat—suggesting that 
longitudinal agreement is unilaterally predictive of promotion rate regardless of the 
magnitude of the slopes. Interestingly, promotion rate along this line was among the 
lowest. Along the line of perfect disagreement, promotion rate is higher for individuals 
who have higher disagreement over time—individuals that had very steeply positive 
trajectories while their manager gave them steeply negative trajectories had the highest 
promotion rate. A summary of the models fit to the promotion data can be found in Table 
7. 
Pay raise trajectories were also the only outcome used for the pay raise data. Both 
initial agreement and agreement over time predicted pay raise trajectories (see Figures 11 
and 12). For initial agreement, the effect was once again variable as a function of 
performance level but in the opposite direction as predicted. Agreement at low levels of 
performance was associated with steeper pay raise trajectories than agreement at 
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moderate and high levels of performance. The response surface at the line of 
disagreement was flat and at the bottom of the trajectories, suggesting that disagreement 
is unilaterally worse for pay raise trajectories. For agreement over time, perfect 
agreement had an inverted U-shape relationship with pay raise trajectories—individuals 
who agreed with their managers on relatively constant slopes had higher pay raise 
trajectories than individuals agreeing on increasingly positive or negative slopes. As 
expected with the convergence hypothesis, individuals with different rating slopes than 
their managers’ had the highest levels of pay raise trajectories. Summaries of the models 
fit to the pay raise data can be found in Table 8. 
For organizational level, all three polynomial regressions predicted significantly 
more variance than the simple linear model (Table 9). For initial organizational level, the 
line of agreement has an inverted U-shape—individuals agreeing about high levels of 
performance had the highest organizational level, followed by individuals agreeing about 
low levels of performance (Figure 13). The line of disagreement has a slightly linear 
surface: the lowest organizational levels were associated with individuals who initially 
rated themselves at low levels of performance while their manager gave them a high 
rating. 
Results for the organizational level trajectories were more counter-intuitive. It 
appears that the initial level of performance influences organizational level trajectories; 
however, the surface along both the line of agreement and line of disagreement had U-
shaped curves, suggesting that perfect agreement at high and low levels of performance 
are associated with high organizational level, as well as perfect disagreement in both 
conditions (e.g. whether the self is a 5 and the manager is a 1 or vice-versa). Interestingly, 
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the line with the minimum value appears to occur where the manager’s rating is ~3, and 
is flat along the self-rating line, suggesting that individuals that receive an initial 
performance rating near the midpoint of the scale from their manager experience the 
lowest progression throughout the company (Figure 14).  
Organization level trajectories predicted by longitudinal agreement results were 
similar. Consistent with the convergence hypothesis, the surface along the line of 
disagreement was U-shaped: individuals with different slopes than their manager’s had 
higher outcomes than individuals with more similar slopes. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that agreement about increasing trajectories is better than agreement about 
decreasing trajectories, the surface at the high end of the line of agreement is higher than 
the surface at the low end of the line—however, the line is U-shaped as well, suggesting 
that agreeing about decreasing performance is associated with higher organizational level 
trajectories than agreeing about steadier performance (Figure 15). 
Continuous outcomes with control variables. For many of the analyses, 
including the control variables did very little to alter the results. Initial rating agreement 
predicted initial salary (Figure 16; Table 10); longitudinal agreement predicted promotion 
rate trajectories (Figure 17; Table 11); initial performance rating agreement and 
longitudinal agreement predicted pay raise trajectories (Figures 18 and 19; Table 12); and 
results for organizational level outcomes (Figures 20, 21, and 22; Table 13) in identical 
ways, albeit to somewhat less extreme degrees. The only difference in results is for the 
salary outcomes—without the control variables salary trajectories were predicted by 
initial performance rating agreement, but with control variables they were not. 
Conversely, without control variables salary trajectories were not predicted by 
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longitudinal agreement, but with control variables they were. 
The response surface for salary trajectories resembles the response surface for 
initial salary predicted by initial agreement (Figure 23). Like organizational level 
trajectories, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that agreement about 
increasing trajectories is better than agreement about decreasing trajectories, the surface 
at the high end of the line of agreement is higher than the surface at the low end of the 
line—however, the line is U-shaped as well, suggesting that agreeing about decreasing 
performance is associated with higher salary trajectories than agreeing about steadier 
performance. A summary of the results and their consistencies with the various 
hypotheses is shown in Table 14. 
Dichotomous outcomes. The base rates of each event occurring in the dataset 
were very different: turnover was very low (3.5%) whereas manager change was much 
more probable (46%). It is not surprising, then, that turnover was not significantly 
predicted by longitudinal agreement. Change in manager that is not due to supervisor 
turnover or promotion, however, was predicted by agreement category (see Table 15 for 
observed versus expected breakouts for each category). Consistent Under-raters and 
Reformed Under-raters turned over significantly less often than expected. Serial 
Overraters turned over at a significantly higher rate than would be expected. To a lesser, 
non-significant degree, Deflated Agreers turned over more than expected. Similarly, 
Serial Under-raters turned over less often than expected to a lesser degree.  
Effects of Feedback 
The results from the analyses that tested whether participation in a feedback 
program would influence future performance rating trajectories were interesting. For self-
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ratings of performance, participation in a multisource feedback procedure did not 
influence trajectories or slopes—the models including those terms separately did not 
achieve better fit to the data than the baseline model. However, both models testing the 
intercept and slope effects on managerial ratings separately and the model which modeled 
them together fit the data significantly better than the baseline. An examination of the 
estimates (see Table 16) suggests that following an employee’s participation in a 
multisource feedback process managers’ ratings of performance decrease in both 
intercept and slope. 
Discussion 
Conclusions 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the results of this research. 
First, individuals tend to begin their performance rating career either over-rating 
themselves or under-rating themselves relative to their manager’s rating of their 
performance. This finding is consistent with previous research which suggests that 
individuals tend to differ from their managers in performance ratings (Fleenor, 
McCauley, & Brutus, 1996). In addition, these results suggest that the majority of 
individuals tend to converge with their managers’ ratings over time, similar to the 
findings of Bailey and Fletcher (2002). 
In terms of its relationship to individual outcomes, initial agreement is not 
unilaterally better: as expected, the level of performance in the initial performance ratings 
upon which there is agreement is a factor in its relationship to outcomes. Consistent with 
previous research (Brief, Aldag, & Van Sell, 1977; Brutus, Fleenor, & McCauley, 1999; 
Gentry, Hannum, Ekelund, & de Jong, 2007; Ostroff et al., 2004; Sala, 2003), individuals 
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that are organizationally higher and have higher salaries are associated with high levels of 
agreement about initial high performance. In addition, initial agreement can impact 
important individual longitudinal outcomes: initial agreement predicted salary 
trajectories, organizational level trajectories, and pay raise trajectories. In the longitudinal 
outcome case, convergence is important as well for many variables. Agreement over time 
(i.e., similar slopes) is not associated with high levels of individual outcomes—in fact, 
disagreement longitudinally is. As previously discussed, when individuals disagree with 
their manager they are likely converging in their ratings (59% of the sample converged in 
their ratings; only 28% of the disagreeing sample was diverging from each other). 
Including control variables (gender, tenure, ethnicity) did little to affect these 
results. Additionally, agreement was not associated with turnover behavior, but did 
predict changing managers (not due to manager promotion or turnover) such that those 
that overrate themselves turnover at a higher rate than expected. Finally, participating in 
other feedback programs may not positively influence future agreement. It only seems to 
affect manager ratings, and in a negative way. 
Limitations 
These analyses, however, are not without their limitations and considerations. 
First, linear mixed effects models have assumptions that may be considered undesirable. 
For example, the random effects (i.e., the individual slopes and intercepts) are assumed to 
be normally distributed.  Also, the confidence intervals around the individual slope and 
intercept values were fairly narrow—so while the intercepts and slopes were statistically 
different, the magnitude of the differences were sometimes minor. However, all current 
procedures for estimating individual growth curves (e.g., Latent Curve Analysis) suffer 
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from these issues. A few more pertinent issues with these particular data are with the 
polynomial regression interpretation—extrapolation and variance captured. In all 
response surface analyses, the easiest way to understand their effects are by looking at the 
four extreme corners of the plot, where X and Y are most extreme and are either equal or 
opposite. Unfortunately, these parts of the plot are where the least amount of data exist—
scatterplots of the available data for both sets of predictors are in Figure 23. Similarly, in 
many cases, the polynomial models captured significantly more variance than the simple 
linear model, but in some cases the absolute amount of variance predicted is very low—
clearly there is much more at play in the prediction of these outcomes that has not been 
captured in this study. Thus, most of these results may not replicate in future samples, 
and the results with particularly low variance explained (e.g., for pay raise data) should 
be taken with a larger grain of salt. 
In addition to the weaknesses of the method and the data, there are certain 
weaknesses in the design of this research. The most obvious threat to the external validity 
of these results is that the data come from one single organization, whose business 
structure is somewhat unique (i.e., a cooperative). However, despite these nominal 
differences between this business and others, the nature of the work and therefore of 
perceived performance is not fundamentally different from any other organization, at 
least of which the author has been a part. In addition, in order to be included in the 
analyses, each of the individuals had to have been employed at the company for at least 3 
years so that they would have at least three data points from which to construct 
performance rating trajectories. At this company, the majority of individuals for which 
data were available (76%) met this criterion. However, employees that stay at a company 
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for more than 2 years are uncommon in the current employment climate—median tenure 
in 2016 was 4.2 years (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016). 
Implications 
In conclusion, it seems that performance appraisal agreement can be a useful 
indicator of underlying organizational behavior. These results provide some evidence that 
the effects of performance rating agreement can have an impact when it is downward 
feedback as well, and can impact outcomes longitudinally. Future researchers should 
capture more explanatory variables (e.g., job codes) and perhaps use both this design but 
with data from only individuals that started with the system in place (i.e., using only 
individuals with tenure equal to the study length, that have only ever had one 
performance appraisal system). There is also a need to replicate these results in other 
organizational settings. Thus, the goals of this research study were achieved. This is just 
one study among many possible studies that speak to the nature of agreement over time, 
the outcomes associated with it, and potential influences of feedback on agreement. In 
addition, these results provide evidence that performance ratings, with all their flaws and 
issues, are still a useful tool in the I-O psychologist’s toolkit. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor’s (1979) model of the effects of feedback on 
recipients. 
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Figure 2: An overview of Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) Feedback Intervention Theory 
(FIT). 
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Figure 3: An overview of Spence & Keeping’s (2013) model of motivation of job 
performance raters. 
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Figure 4: Overview of Ashford’s (1989) model of self-assessment.  
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Figure 5: Overview of Atwater & Yammarino’s (1997) model of self-other agreement in 
job performance ratings. 
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Figure 7: Hypothetical graphs to illustrate potential outcomes of polynomial analyses.  
For intercept effects: A) Agreement is unilaterally better for outcomes, regardless of performance 
level. B) Agreement’s effects depend on the level of performance. For slope effects: C) 
Agreement on growth is better than agreement on decline. D) Convergence over time is best.  
A B 
C D 
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Figure 8: Response surface for initial salary (in $1k) predicted by initial performance 
ratings. 
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Figure 9: Response surface for salary trajectories predicted by initial ratings. 
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Figure 10: Response surface for promotion trajectories (expected # promotions per year) 
predicted by rating trajectories. 
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Figure 11: Response surface for pay raise trajectories (in # raises per year) predicted by 
initial performance ratings. 
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Figure 12: Response surface for pay raise trajectories (in # raises per year) predicted by 
rating trajectories. 
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Figure 13: Response surface for initial organizational level predicted by initial 
performance ratings. 
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Figure 14: Response surface for organizational level trajectory predicted by initial 
performance ratings. 
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Figure 15: Response surface for organizational level trajectory predicted by performance 
ratings slopes. 
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Figure 16: Response surface for initial salary (in $1k) predicted by initial performance 
ratings with control variables. 
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Figure 17: Response surface for promotion trajectories (expected # promotions per year) 
predicted by rating trajectories with control variables. 
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Figure 18: Response surface for pay raise trajectories (in # raises per year) predicted by 
initial performance ratings with control variables. 
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Figure 19: Response surface for pay raise trajectories (in # raises per year) predicted by 
rating trajectories with control variables. 
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Figure 20: Response surface for initial organizational level predicted by initial 
performance ratings with control variables. 
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Figure 21: Response surface for organizational level trajectory predicted by initial 
performance ratings with control variables. 
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Figure 22: Response surface for organizational level trajectory predicted by performance 
ratings slopes with control variables. 
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Figure 23: Response surface for salary trajectories predicted by longitudinal agreement 
with control variables. 
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Figure 24: Scatterplots for polynomial regression data.  
187 
Table 1 
Annual performance rating dimensions of the organization 
Tables 
Rating Level Criteria 
5 - Outstanding  Performance consistently exceeds expectations even 
under challenging circumstances; sets and 
accomplishes stretch goals 
 Possesses, demonstrates, and leverages higher level 
capabilities in addition to competencies, skillsets, or 
knowledge critical for effective job performance. 
 Performance and capabilities are significantly higher 
than most peers in similar jobs/levels 
4 – More than fully contributing  Performance consistently meets and often exceeds 
expectations; sets and accomplishes most stretch goals 
 Possesses and demonstrates the competencies, 
skillsets, or knowledge critical for effective job 
performance and is actively developing higher 
capabilities. 
 Performance and capabilities are higher than most 
peers in similar jobs/levels 
3 – Fully contributing  Performance consistently meets expectations and 
achieves agreed upon goals/objectives including some 
stretch goals. 
 Possesses and demonstrates the competencies, 
skillsets, or knowledge critical for effective job 
performance and is continuously upgrading personal 
capability. 
 Performance and capabilities match most peers in 
similar jobs/levels 
2 – Needs some improvement  Performance meets some, but not all, expectations and 
achieves some, but not all, goals/objectives; making 
some progress at improving performance but still 
requires frequent guidance. 
 Lacks some of the competencies, skillsets, or 
knowledge critical for effective job performance. 
 Performance and capabilities are lower than most 
peers in similar jobs/levels 
1 – Needs significant improvement  Performance is below expectations and usually does 
not achieve agreed upon goals/objectives; not making 
required progress at improving performance despite 
repeated feedback and guidance. 
 Lacks many of the competencies, skillsets, or 
knowledge critical for effective job performance. 
 Performance and capabilities are significantly lower 
than most peers in similar jobs/levels 
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Table 2  
Competency model of the organization—names and descriptions 
Competency Description 
Demonstrate Agility Responds resourcefully, flexibly, and positively when 
faced with new challenges and demands, moving 
forward productively under conditions of change or 
uncertainty. Learns from setbacks or mistakes and 
quickly bounces back. Deals effectively with 
ambiguity. 
Make Insightful Decisions Analyzes both problems and opportunities and their 
impact on the business, customers and other key 
stakeholders. Integrates information, data, guidelines, 
and requirements from different sources to evaluate 
alternatives and make effective, timely and well-
reasoned decisions. 
Act Boldly Challenges the status quo.  Tackles tough assignments, 
proactively holds courageous conversations, steps 
forward to address difficult issues with transparency, 
and supports others who do so. Capably balances risk 
with reward.  Doesn't hold back on anything that needs 
to be said.  Maintains relationships while acting boldly. 
Lead & Embrace Change Initiates and leads change to ensure continuous 
improvement and make the organization successful. 
Responds resourcefully and constructively to new 
opportunities to learn and grow and new ways of 
getting work done. 
Act Strategically Aligns the capabilities and strategies of the 
organization to capture emerging trends, address 
competitive threats, meet market needs, and provide 
value to customers. Works to enhance organizational 
value and create competitive advantage. 
Innovate to Grow Generates and champions new ideas, approaches and 
initiatives, and creates an environment that nurtures 
innovation. Supports business transformation by 
encouraging new ways of looking at problems, 
processes or solutions. 
Engage & Include Builds relationships inside and outside of the 
organization that enhance the levels of cooperation, 
collaboration and trust.  Fosters a culture that makes 
people feel valued and respected, appreciates diverse 
opinions, and even in difficult or tense circumstances 
builds trust and enhances relationships. Promotes a free 
and timely flow of high quality information and ideas 
across the organization. 
Influence & Inspire Articulates a compelling rationale that inspires 
commitment to a point of view or plan of action. 
Instills and sustains energy and optimism, helping 
others to envision a greater sense of what is possible. 
Models personal commitment. 
189 
Build Talent Attracts, develops, manages, and retains critical and 
diverse talent.  Provides coaching, feedback, and 
support, and shares best practices, effectively and 
constructively enabling individuals to achieve high 
performance. Differentiates and recognizes outstanding 
performance and deals constructively with 
underperformance in a timely manner. 
Demonstrate Integrity in Products, 
Processes & Relationships 
Demonstrates principled leadership and sound business 
ethics; shows consistency among principles, values, 
and behavior; builds trust with others through own 
authenticity. 
Execute with Focus & 
Accountability 
Ensures work performance and accountability, 
demonstrating and fostering a sense of urgency and 
focus. Has a "can-do" spirit, a sense of ownership, and 
a strong commitment to achieving goals, meeting 
customer requirements and organizational success. 
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Table 3  
Illustration of the possible longitudinal agreement categories 
 Intercept Difference (Manger – Self) 
Negative None Positive 
Slope Difference 
(Manager – Self) 
Positive 
Reformed  
Over-rater 
Deflated Agreer 
Serial  
Under-rater 
None 
Consistent  
Over-rater 
Consistent 
Agreer 
Consistent 
Under-rater 
Negative Serial Over-rater Inflated Agreer 
Reformed 
Under-rater 
 
  
191 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for appraisal ratings by year 
Year 
Self-Ratings Manager Ratings Manager – Self 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
2011 3.635 0.686 3.534 0.807 -0.106 0.813 
2012 3.671 0.706 3.575 0.774 -0.100 0.771 
2013 3.660 0.703 3.548 0.759 -0.114 0.792 
2014 3.615 0.676 3.505 0.744 -0.110 0.759 
2015 3.540 0.770 3.494 0.736 -0.074 0.755 
       
0 3.641 0.676 3.536 0.806 -0.105 0.812 
1 3.675 0.696 3.577 0.772 -0.098 0.769 
2 3.666 0.691 3.548 0.758 -0.118 0.780 
3 3.641 0.664 3.535 0.756 -0.106 0.759 
4 3.599 0.698 3.540 0.742 -0.059 0.742 
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Table 5 
Agreement statistics by performance year 
Year ρ κ (unweighted) κ (linear weights) κ (squared weights) 
2011 0.421 0.284 0.336 0.400 
2012 0.454 0.273 0.349 0.448 
2013 0.420 0.283 0.337 0.403 
2014 0.432 0.299 0.353 0.425 
2015 0.469 0.331 0.384 0.449 
     
0 0.421 0.284 0.336 0.401 
1 0.454 0.273 0.349 0.448 
2 0.427 0.284 0.341 0.416 
3 0.435 0.307 0.359 0.426 
4 0.489 0.347 0.400 0.478 
 
ρ Spearman’s rho for rank-order agreement 
k (unweighted) Cohen’s kappa where all levels of disagreement are treated equally 
k (linear weights) Cohen’s kappa where increased disagreement is penalized but at a constant level 
k (squared weights) Cohen’s kappa where increased disagreement is more severely penalized  
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Table 6 
Summaries of models fit to salary data (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Salary Intercepts
a 
Salary Trajectories
b 
Salary Trajectories 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
       
Intercept -$16,132 $149,965 0.006 -0.069 0.051 0.051 
Self $10,814 $2,599 -0.003 0.004 0.029 0.029 
Manager $13,294 -$71,228 0.015 0.051 -0.008 -0.007 
Self
2 
 -$2,737  0.001  -0.015 
Manager
2 
 $7,755  -0.003  0.045 
Self×Mgr  $7,753  -0.004  0.090 
       
R
2
(adj) 0.067 0.075* 0.050 0.051* 0.003 0.005 
 
a 
model coefficients predicting salary intercepts are interpreted as dollars 
b
 model coefficients predicting salary slopes are interpreted as % change in salary per year 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 7 
Summaries of models fit to promotions data (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Promotion Trajectories
a 
Promotions Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
     
Intercept -0.050 -0.154 0.170 0.164 
Self 0.003 0.031 0.120 0.119 
Manager 0.034 0.064 -0.070 -0.078 
Self
2 
 -0.006  -0.118 
Manager
2 
 -0.006  0.944 
Self×Mgr  0.004  -0.729 
     
R
2
(adj) 0.030 0.030 0.001 0.003* 
 
a
 model coefficients predicting promotion slopes are interpreted as ½ expected # promotions per year 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 8 
Summaries of models fit to pay raise data (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Pay Raise Trajectories
a 
Pay Raise Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
     
Intercept 0.422 0.769 0.289 0.291 
Self -0.017 -0.129 0.016 0.018 
Manager -0.020 -0.099 0.033 0.030 
Self
2 
 0.003  0.161 
Manager
2 
 -0.002  -0.276 
Self×Mgr  0.025  -0.425 
     
R
2
(adj) 0.024 0.027* 0.001 0.004* 
 
a
 model coefficients predicting pay raise slopes are interpreted as ½ expected # raises per year 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 9 
Summaries of models fit to organizational level data (N = 3,401) 
Criterion: Org. Level Intercepts Org. Level Trajectories
 
Org Level Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
      
Intercept -0.041 16.779 -0.266 0.906 0.241 0.226 
Self 1.546 -0.371 0.018 -0.060 0.277 0.282 
Manager 1.314 -6.116 0.123 -0.456 -0.071 -0.082 
Self
2 
 -0.248  0.015  0.013 
Manager
2 
 0.500  0.086  1.935 
Self×Mgr  1.032  -0.010  -0.858 
       
R
2
(adj) 0.073 0.078* 0.017 0.020* 0.001 0.002* 
 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 10 
Summaries of models fit to salary data with control variables (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Salary Intercepts
a 
Salary Trajectories
b 
Salary Trajectories 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
       
Intercept -$28,898 $129,355 0.013 -0.054 0.060 0.059 
Self $10,039 -$2,856 -0.002 0.012 0.019 0.019 
Manager $14,097 -$51,551 0.015 0.039 -0.010 -0.009 
Self
2 
 -$2,137  < 0.001  -0.024 
Manager
2 
 $5,062  < 0.001  0.079 
Self×Mgr  $7,873  -0.005  0.101 
       
Ethnicity
c
       
Native $4,842 $3,617 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 
Asian $8,009 $8,595 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Black $6,909 $7,011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Hispanic -$383 -$11 0.001 0.001 < 0.001 0.001 
Pacific Is. -$5,303 $5,599 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.020 
≥ 2 races $3,466 $3,404 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
Gender
d
 -$22,025 -$21,756 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Tenure $689 $682 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
       
R
2
(adj) 0.165 0.170* 0.133 0.134 0.082 0.084* 
 
a 
model coefficients predicting salary intercepts are interpreted as dollars 
b
 model coefficients predicting salary slopes are interpreted as % change in salary per year 
c
 reference group is employee ethnicity = white 
d
 reference group is employee gender = male 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 11 
Summaries of models fit to promotions data with control variables (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Promotion Trajectories
a 
Promotions Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
     
Intercept -0.069 -0.212 0.214 0.203 
Self 0.009 0.098 0.067 0.064 
Manager 0.070 0.059 -0.082 -0.089 
Self
2 
 -0.016  -0.200 
Manager
2 
 -0.003  1.096 
Self×Mgr  0.008  -0.615 
     
Ethnicity
b
     
Native -0.015 -0.014 0.006 0.010 
Asian -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
Black 0.038 0.037 0.030 0.032 
Hispanic 0.038 0.038 0.034 0.034 
Pacific Is. -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.027 
≥ 2 -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.033 
Gender
c
 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
Tenure -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
     
R
2
(adj) 0.082 0.082 0.052 0.056* 
 
a
 model coefficients predicting promotion slopes are interpreted as ½ expected # promotions per year 
b
 reference group is employee ethnicity = white 
c
 reference group is employee gender = male 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 12 
Summaries of models fit to pay raise data with control variables (N = 3,403) 
Criterion: Pay Raise Trajectories
a 
Pay Raise Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
     
Intercept 0.438 0.777 0.301 0.304 
Self -0.017 -0.121 0.002 0.005 
Manager -0.019 -0.105 0.031 0.027 
Self
2 
 0.002  0.164 
Manager
2 
 -0.001  -0.238 
Self×Mgr  0.024  -0.451 
     
Ethnicity
b
     
Native 0.019 0.015 0.008 0.009 
Asian 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 
Black -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
Hispanic 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 
Pacific Is. -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.010 
≥ 2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 
Gender
c
 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     
R
2
(adj) 0.034 0.037* 0.011 0.014* 
 
a
 model coefficients predicting pay raise slopes are interpreted as expected # raises per year 
b
 reference group is employee ethnicity = white 
c
 reference group is employee gender = male 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 13 
Summaries of models fit to organizational level data with control variables (N = 3,401) 
Criterion: Org. Level Intercepts Org. Level Trajectories
 
Org Level Trajectories
 
Predictor: Ratings Intercepts Ratings Intercepts Ratings Slopes 
      
Intercept -0.319 15.43 -0.189 0.941 0.329 0.314 
Self 1.495 -0.990 0.019 -0.014 0.185 0.190 
Manager 1.339 -4.907 0.127 -0.476 -0.081 -0.096 
Self
2 
 -0.190  0.012  0.054 
Manager
2 
 0.313  0.092  2.190 
Self×Mgr  1.073  -0.017  -1.151 
       
Ethnicity
a
       
Native 0.503 0.333 0.162 0.158 0.210 0.218 
Asian 0.744 0.806 -0.064 -0.061 -0.058 -0.055 
Black 1.342 1.365 0.019 0.019 0.005 0.009 
Hispanic -0.244 -0.202 0.031 0.032 0.023 0.023 
Pacific Is. -0.268 0.302 0.159 0.162 0.174 0.115 
≥ 2 1.326 1.322 -0.014 -0.016 -0.021 -0.017 
Gender
b
 -0.541 -0.516 -0.102 -0.099 -0.098 -0.099 
Tenure 0.088 0.087 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
       
R
2
(adj) 0.100 0.104* 0.039 0.042* 0.021 0.023* 
 
b
 reference group is employee ethnicity = white 
c
 reference group is employee gender = male 
* difference in model fit p < 0.05 
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Table 14 
Summary of conclusions supported by all response surface analyses 
Outcome 
Initial 
Agreement 
Longitudinal 
Agreement 
Initial 
Agreement 
(with controls) 
Longitudinal 
Agreement 
(with controls) 
Salary     
Initial B - B - 
Trajectory B - - C 
     
Promotion Rate - D - D 
     
Pay Raise Rate NA D NA D 
     
Org. Level     
Initial B - B - 
Trajectory B C, D B C,D 
 
A: agreement is unilaterally better 
B: the effect of agreement is a function of performance level 
C: agreement about growth is better than agreement about decline 
D: convergence in ratings is better 
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Table 15  
Survival analysis results from managerial change data 
Agreement Category N Observed Expected 
(𝑂−𝐸)2
𝐸 a
 
(𝑂−𝐸)2
𝑉 b
 
Consistent Agreer 41 18 20.4 0.286 0.29 
Consistent Over-rater 181 88 87.7 > 0.001 > 0.01 
Consistent Under-rater 94 33 55.4 9.084 9.54 
Deflated Agreer 39 17 11.0 3.265 3.33 
Inflated Agreer 90 44 47.2 0.218 0.23 
Reformed Over-rater 1368 667 642.4 0.944 1.60 
Reformed Under-rater 705 310 343.0 3.178 4.10 
Serial Over-rater 607 297 248.6 9.428 11.30 
Serial Under-rater 370 133 151.2 2.194 2.45 
 
a analogous to a variance; the magnitude of the deviance between observed and expected 
b analogous to a χ
2
; tests against the null hypothesis that expected is equal to observed; 
any value > 3.84 is significant 
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Table 16 
Models applied to appraisal data to test for feedback effects 
 Baseline Δ Intercepts Δ Slope Δ Int. & Slope 
Self Ratings     
Fixed Effects     
Intercept 3.797 3.794 3.797 3.797 
Time 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.007 
Participation  -0.026  -0.037 
Time(since 360)   0.002 0.011 
     
Variance components     
Within person 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 
In initial status 0.285 0.285 0.230 0.286 
In rate of change 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
     
Goodness-of-fit     
Deviance 1500.0 1499.8 1500.0 1499.7 
AIC 1512.0 1513.8 1514.0 1515.7 
BIC 1540.3 1546.8 1547.0 1553.4 
     
Manager Ratings     
Fixed Effects     
Intercept 3.786 3.763 3.757 3.753 
Time -0.002 0.064 0.051 0.077 
Participation  -0.253  -0.208 
Time(since 360)   -0.096 -0.044 
     
Variance components     
Within person 0.364 0.358 0.359 0.357 
In initial status 0.306 0.294 0.299 0.294 
In rate of change 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.016 
     
Goodness-of-fit     
Deviance 1787.4 1775.3 1780.3 1774.1 
AIC 1799.4 1789.3 1794.3 1790.1 
BIC 1827.7 1822.3 1827.3 1827.8 
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Table 17 
Intra-class correlations for models fit to longitudinal data 
Model ICC 
Self rating ~ Year 0.561 
Manager rating ~ Year 0.549 
Salary ~ Year 0.986 
Promotion rate ~ Year 0.294 
Organization level ~ Year 0.917 
Pay raise rate ~ Year 0.461 
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Appe ndices 
Appendix A 
Items on the multisource feedback instrument: 
1. Knows who to involve in decision making.  
2. Follows through on commitments. 
3. Communicates progress, problems, and information to key stakeholders in a 
timely manner. 
4. Develops new and innovative approaches. 
5. Anticipates and deals effectively with resistance to change. 
6. Seeks performance feedback and acts on it to improve self. 
7. Develops and implements plans to effectively manage change while 
simultaneously maintaining operating effectiveness. 
8. Works with employees to develop their skills; provides coaching and feedback. 
9. Builds positive and effective working relationships both within the organization 
and with external partners and customers. 
10. Fosters an environment that promotes continuous improvement and desired 
outcomes of change. 
11. Approaches problems and opportunities from a broad company perspective. 
12. Willingly takes on challenging assignments.  
13. Treats everyone with dignity and respect, regardless of their background, position, 
or situation. 
14. Speaks up and is willing to take an unpopular stand. 
15. Understands the financial implications of decisions and actions. 
16. Can think on his/her feet. 
17. Conducts business with honesty and integrity. 
18. Addresses performance problems in a timely manner. 
19. Makes good decisions in a timely manner. 
20. Evaluates and pursues initiatives, investments, and opportunities based on their fit 
with broader company strategies. 
21. Ensures others understand the way their work supports broader organizational 
strategies. 
22. Takes action now to position the organization for future success. 
23. Is good at generating long-term and strategic ideas to drive future business. 
24. Is resilient, especially in new or challenging situations. 
25. Gives honest answers to questions and challenges. 
26. Keeps others informed. 
27. Willing to challenge upwardly (with his/her manager, other leaders). 
28. Honors agreements made with others. 
29. Is open in communications with others, even when it's easier not to be. 
30. Creates or sponsors systems and processes that encourage creativity and 
innovation. 
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31. Is open to others' ideas and recommendations. 
32. Learns from mistakes. 
33. Takes action to build a diverse and respectful team. 
34. Remains calm and controlled in difficult situations. 
35. Collaborates effectively across all groups. 
36. Motivates and inspires the team to work toward the organization's mission and 
values. 
37. Is resourceful and figures out how to get things done in spite of obstacles. 
38. Thinks "outside the box" and comes up with new ways of doing things. 
39. Communicates clearly and concisely. 
40. Takes a big picture perspective. 
41. Rewards and recognizes outstanding behavior. 
42. Willing to take calculated risks. 
43. Holds people accountable. 
44. Leverages leading-edge technologies, processes, tools, and practices to contribute 
to the organization's future. 
45. Makes decisions that are the best for the overall company. 
46. Takes responsibility for actions, including decisions made and mistakes. 
47. Manages his/her time effectively. 
48. Rewards and recognizes creativity and innovation. 
49. Helps others to seek feedback from and actively manage stakeholders. 
50. Ensures that products, processes, and relationships are sound and ethical. 
51. Effectively balances honesty with compassion. 
52. Demonstrates consistency among principles, values, and behavior. 
 
